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December 22, 1993 
Mary T. Noonan, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: Nielson v. Gurley, Case No. 930327-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court 
is advised of the recent decision of Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Systems, Inc., 227 Ut. Adv. 
Rep. 64 (Utah App., decided December 7, 1993), which was published subsequent to the brief 
of Appellee filed herein on December 9, 1993. The Goodmansen case is believed to be pertinent 
and significant to Appellee's arguments for the award of sanctions at Point V, pages 43-48, of 
the Brief of Appellee. 
The reasons the Goodmansen case is pertinent, briefly stated, are that this Court held that 
a settlement agreement, confirmed by an exchange of letters, was valid and binding despite 
changes or disputes over insignificant terms. Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Judgment, dated 
April 28, 1992 and Renewed Motion for Entry of Judgment, dated June 19, 1992 demonstrated 
that the Defendant had agreed to settle and reneged on agreements to settle the above-entitled 
matter thrice; first, in July of 1991 for the amount of costs incurred ($125.00), together with 
restraint of the Defendant's wrongful practices; second, in an agreement entered into with the 
Court, for substantially the same amount, as the judgment entered herein, together with the 
restraint of Defendant's conduct, confirmed Jby Judge Brian's Minute Entry dated February 24, 
1992, and the letter of Assistant Attorney General, Reed M. Stringham, dated February 25, 1992; 
and third, by formal settlement agreement signed by Defendant's counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson, 
on April 13, 1992, providing for the payment of damages in substantially the amount awarded 
herein, together with the restraint of the Defendant. 
The Goodmansen holding is pertinent to Judge Young's Conclusions Nos. 8 and 9, R. 
1946, that the Defendant's conduct of this litigation was in bad faith, awarding bad faith damages 
and enjoining the Defendant individually. Judge Young's "bad faith litigation" ruling was based, 
in part, on Defendant's failure to honor settlement agreements entered into by his counsel or to 
acknowledge and conform to the Partial Summary Judgment determining his conduct unlawful 
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FAX: 
(801)531-6690 
Judge Young's conclusions in that regard are evident in Findings of Fact No. 13, R. 1949, that 
the Defendant's supervisors at the Division of Wildlife Resources should have "readily 
acknowledged and affirmatively restrained" his unlawful activities. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DANIEL DARGER 
Attorney at Law 
DD:kl 
cc: Parker Nielson 
Dennis Fergerson 
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(0069) 
Plaintiff-Appellee Parker M. Nielson ("Nielson" herein) , 
answers the Brief of Appellant ("Br." herein) of Defendant-
Appellant Dale Gurley ("Gurley" herein) . 
JURISDICTION 
This Court is without jurisdiction, timely notice of appeal 
not having been filed. Gurley's citation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(k) in support of his claim of 
jurisdiction is of no avail, for both contemplate and require 
timely notice of appeal. 
ANSWER TO "STATEMENT OF ISSUES" 
We recognize and acknowledge that it is the province of the 
Appellant to frame the issues, for "the party who brings a suit 
[or appeal] is master to decide what law he will rely upon. . . ." 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 512 
(1989). Gurley nevertheless misstates the issues, for the Utah 
Supreme Court directed decision of the following questions: 
1. WHETHER THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION 
BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED ON FEBRUARY 
26, 1993 IS NOT TIMELY, FINAL JUDGMENT HAVING 
BEEN ENTERED ON JANUARY 7, 1993 AND NO EXTENSION 
OF TIME HAVING BEEN SECURED. 
2. WHETHER COUNSEL FOR GURLEY SHOULD BE 
SANCTIONED UNDER RULE 33 FOR MISREPRESENTING THE 
FACTS, MISREPRESENTING THE RECORD, LACK OF CANDOR 
AND BAD FAITH. 
The Minute Entry of the Utah Supreme Court dated April 5, 1993, 
directed consideration of the first issue, as follows: 
Plaintiff's motion to dismiss is this day denied, 
and the court defers its ruling until plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case. 
and the Supreme Court's Minute Entry of May 4, 1993 directed 
consideration of the second issue: 
The Court defers action on the motion for an 
award of bad faith damages pending considera-
tion of the appeal on its merits. 
Jurisdiction involves a question of law. Cf. , Maverick 
Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. p.7 
(Utah App., decided Sept. 7, 1993). The question of sanctions is 
an appeal to this Court's discretion. Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, 224 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah App., decided Oct. 25, 1993). 
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED 
This case involves construction of the Utah Game Bird Code, 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-4, et seq., the definitions of "Protected 
Wildlife" and "Wildlife" at Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2, and the 
regulations for the possession of live game birds at Utah Admin. 
Code § R608-4-1, et seq. Said statutes and regulations are 
reproduced at Addendum "A." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Appellant misstates the case. This is a simple action for 
conversion, interference with contract rights and injunctive 
relief. It has nothing to do with any "trap." 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Nielson filed suit against Gurley on September 13, 1990 for 
conversion and interference with contract rights incident to a 
game farm licensed by the State of Utah. (A defamation claim was 
not pursued at trial.) Partial Summary Judgment was entered by 
the Honorable David S. Young on June 24, 1991. (Addendum "G.") 
After Summary Judgment was entered, Gurley asserted that he acted 
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as a peace officer. Nielson promptly posted the bond required for 
suit against a peace officer, filed a new notice of claim, and 
filed a new action seeking injunctive relief. 
The two actions, denominated herein as No. 3 02 (the original 
conversion/interference with contract claim) and No. 249 (the 
claim for injunctive relief), respectively, were consolidated and 
went to trial, on the merits, before the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Judge sitting without a jury, who found in a Memorandum 
Decision at R. 1908-1915 (Addendum "E") that there was a willful, 
malicious, and knowingly reckless disregard of the rights of 
Nielson and an intentional disregard of the proclamations of the 
Wildlife Board. The trial court further found that the super-
visors of Gurley at the Division of Wildlife Resources ("DWR" 
herein) knew or should have known of Gurley7s dislike for dog 
training activities and should have disciplined Gurley prior to 
the destruction of Nielson's pen, acknowledged and affirmatively 
sought to remedy the effects of Gurley's misconduct. (Findings 
and Conclusions, Addendum "F," % 13, R. 1949.) The trial court 
therefore enjoined Gurley individually from such conduct. 
(Findings ff 6-11, R. 1951-1949.) 
Final judgment was entered on January 7, 1993 (R. 1955). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Gurley's "statement of facts" bears no relationship to the 
facts determined by the trial court or recited by this Court in 
Nielson v. Division of POST, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah App., decided 
April 20, 1993) ("Gurley I"), arid is not supported by a single 
reference to the Record as required by Rule 24(e), Utah Rules of 
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Appellate Procedure. This Court has recently held that "we draw 
the facts from the trial court's findings and reasonable infer-
ences drawn therefrom." Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., 846 
P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah App., decided Feb. 4, 1993), citing Kimball 
v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985). Brief of Appellant 
so far departs from that standard as to offend counsel's obli-
gation of candor and make clear that it is calculated to mislead. 
The correct statement of the facts, with references to the 
Record ("R" herein) and the findings of the trial judge as 
required by Rule 24(a)(7), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
Sparrow, supra., is as follows: 
A. Nielson's Contract Rights Under his Lease and Permit. 
At all material times Nielson held a permit from DWR (R. 6) 
and property rights under Special Use Lease Agreement No. 798 (R. 
12) with the State of Utah, Division of State Lands and Forestry, 
in the subject lands situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, for 
the specific purpose of "releasing and propagating gamebirds for 
hunting dog training and conducting non-commercial competition of 
hunting dogs." (Verified Complaint %% 4-5, R. 21-22, Findings %% 
2, 3, 8, 11, R. 1952, 1950, Memorandum Decision %% 2, 3, 10, 11, 
R. 1915-1908.) 
B. Destruction of Nielson's Property on September 8, 1990. 
Nielson was known to Gurley since at least 1986. (Finding C, 
R. 326.) Prior to the acts alleged, Gurley knew of the activities 
of Nielson and other dog trainers on the subject lands, and had 
openly expressed his hostility and dislike for their sport. Gurley 
also knew that his predetermined opinions were improper, that 
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persons engaged in the sport of dog training were fully authorized 
by law to do so and that any attempts to complicate their activi-
ties were unlawful. (Finding 1 15, R. 1948.) 
Despite that knowledge, on September 8, 1990f Gurley force-
fully and maliciously (see, e.g., Finding % 6, R. 1951) broke 
into a locked pen belonging to Nielson containing a live Chukar 
Partridge (a game bird), which was part of the licensed game farm, 
released the bird, and took private property located therein 
without the consent of the owner. (Finding <| 1, R. 1952, Finding 
B, R. 326.) 
Gurley knew, or should have known, that the bird and the pen 
were the property of Nielson and were used or could have been used 
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training which had 
been conducted at that location for a period of years. (Finding % 
2, R. 1952, Finding B, R. 326.) If he did not already have that 
knowledge, Gurley was informed by livestock men in the area on 
that date that the pen belonged to Nielson and that Nielson was 
staying in a camper behind the store in Vernon, a few miles away. 
(Finding B, R. 32 6.) Facts clearly indicating Gurley's knowledge 
included that the pen was on land Gurley knew was used for hunting 
dog training by Nielson and others and that bands used for banding 
live game birds when used for dog training were found by Gurley at 
the site of the pen. Gurley knew that recapture cones in the 
sides of the pen (viz., wire funnel-shaped openings which permit 
birds outside the pen to enter, but prevent birds from escaping) 
were designed to recapture training birds without injury and that 
the pen was proper for that purpose. (Findings B, D, E and F, R. 
326, 325.) 
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The trial court acknowledged that wild game could also enter a 
lawful device such as the recapture pen, but found it to be a fact 
that the game laws declare such inadvertent capture lawful if they 
are released and Gurley himself had testified that no wild Chukar 
Partridge were in the area of the pen or within a distance of 
approximately five (5) miles. (Finding K 5, R. 1951.) The trial 
court determined it to be a fact that Gurley acted with actual 
malice (Finding f 6, R. 1951) , that he should not have so acted 
and that his conduct was wrongful. (Finding f 9, R. 1950.) 
C. Subsequent Claims of "Peace Officer9' Conduct. 
Statements at Br. 12-13, and passim, that Gurley was a peace 
officer on September 8, 1990 are misleading, for there was no 
indication, at any time prior to initiation of this action that 
Gurley acted in a peace officer capacity. 
Nielson filed No. 302 on September 13, 1993 alleging no peace 
officer conduct. (Complaint, R. 22-14.) Gurley answered the 
complaint, asserting no defense based upon peace officer conduct, 
(R. 36-31, 327-322) and further admitted on October 22, 1990 that 
he made no arrest, including by issuance of any citation for any 
alleged violation of law, at any time and obtained no warrant for 
the search of the premises or seizure of any property therein. 
(Answer to Request No. 7, R. 90.) 
Nielson7s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liabil-
ity, reserving as issues the elements of conversion and interfer-
ence with contract, was granted by the Honorable David S. Young, 
District Judge, on June 24, 1991. (R. 322.) Thereafter Gurley 
asserted — for the first time — that he had acted in a peace 
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officer capacity in a motion to dismiss dated December 5, 1991. 
(R. 821.) Judge Moffat ordered Gurley's Affidavit asserting the 
peace officer claim, which appears at R. 416, stricken because it 
was not accompanied by the certification of his attorney required 
by Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and further stated that 
it was "riddled with untruths." (R. 1536, Addendum "H.") Judge 
Young subsequently determined at the time of trial, after hearing 
the evidence, that Gurley7s claims in that regard were based upon 
false testimony and that he had intentionally conducted a bad 
faith defense. (Finding flf 17-18, R. 1947.) 
The trial court took notice, in rejecting Gurley's claims of 
peace officer conduct, that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 2 3-2 0-15 and the Proclamation for Taking of Upland Game, declare 
"it is unlawful for any person [including a peace officer], 
without the consent of the owner or person in charge of any 
privately owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy any . . . 
enclosure" and that Gurley had admitted that it is not illegal, 
per se, to own, possess or operate a bird pen equipped with 
recapture devices, or to "take" any bird held in private ownership 
lawfully acquired by means of a recapture pen. The trial court 
also found that Gurley failed to follow Utah Administrative Code § 
R608-4-3, which requires peace officers to "request persons . . . 
to exhibit any documentation related to" possession of game 
birds. (Conclusion No. 5, R. 441.) The facts admitted in 
Gurley7s answers to interrogatories, including his investigative 
reports (prepared after this suit was filed, in an apparent 
effort to clothe his acts with authority), established that Gurley 
6 
was familiar with the foregoing laws and regulations concerning 
possession of live game birds. (Findings ^ 3 and 4, R. 1952, 
1951; Finding D through F, R. 326f 325.) The Memorandum Decision 
therefore concluded that Gurley's conduct was not a proper 
exercise of peace officer authority and was with malice toward dog 
trainers as a group and Nielson in particular (R. 1908-1915). 
D. Compliance With the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Representations at Br. 9 that "[p]rior to filing the second 
action (viz., No. 249), plaintiff did not file a notice of claim 
with the Division of Wildlife Resources and the Attorney General 
of the State of Utah" pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act are untrue and advanced in disregard of the Record. To the 
contrary, Nielson promptly obtained an order fixing written 
undertaking in No. 302 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-10 and 
filed the undertaking contemplated for a suit against a peace 
officer on December 9, 1991 (R. 841), a mere four (4) days after 
Gurley's motion first raised the claim of peace officer conduct. 
Nielson also moved to amended his complaint in No. 3 02 (R. 341) in 
response to the newly asserted claim that Gurley acted in a peace 
officer capacity. By that date, notice of claim had been filed 
with both DWR and the Attorney General five (5) separate 
times.—' Nielson also filed a new complaint in No. 249, after 
Paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, a copy of which is at Appellant's Addendum p. 400-
401, alleged that notice of claim was "by certified mail on or about September 3, 1991 . . . on 
three (3) separate occasions; first, by serving a proposed complaint . . . on the Attorney 
General . . . and further serving a copy of said complaint on Gurley and Timothy H. Provan, 
Director of the Division of Wildlife Resources, Gurley's employer, by certified mail . . . 
second, on September 3, 1991, in connection with Plaintiff's Complaint before the Division of 
Peace Officer Standards and Training [viz. , in Gurley I,, supra. ] . . . and third, as a matter of 
caution, and anticipating that the Attorney General would contend that the first and second 
notices were defective, a third notice, entitled "Notice of Claim Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-11(2)" was prepared and filed on December 4, 1991, a copy of which is attached hereto." 
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filing notice of claim, adding a new claim for injunctive relief 
(equitable claims being exempt from governmental immunity). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court lacks jurisdiction, notice of appeal dated 
February 26, 1993 not being within thirty (30) days after final 
judgment on January 7, 1993 and no extension having been obtained. 
Maverick Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, infra.; 
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, infra. 
II. Governmental immunity does not apply to conduct of state 
employees not within their authority, Madsen v. Borthick, 
infra. Notice of claim is not required as to acts of malice, 
Id., claims arising out of contracts, Hansen v. Salt Lake 
County, infra., or equitable actions, American Tierra Corp. v. 
City of West Jordan, infra. 
III. Partial summary judgment was proper, there being no 
genuine issue of fact. Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., infra. In the trial on the merits, no evidence contro-
verting Plaintiff's showing on conversion and interference with 
contract was proffered. No evidence was excluded and the find-
ings of the trial judge determined the elements of RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) TORTS §§ 223 and 237. Appellant has failed to marshal 
Footnote 1 continued 
GurLey's Answer to the Amended Complaint which was verified, admitted that "the documents 
referred to in paragraph 38 of plaintiff's Amended Complaint were filed on or about the dates 
alleged by plaintiff . . . ." (R. 1725.) In addition, the Affidavit of Shauna Herrara at 
Appellant's Addendum pp. 404-424 establishes that notice of claim was filed two (2) more times 
on December 5, 1991, once in the form of a claim for return of property pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-24-2, and again in a form specifically denominated to be pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11(2). 
To state as a fact that notice of claim was not filed "prior to filing the second action," 
in face of those matters in the Record is, we submit, the ultimate in excessive advocacy! 
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evidence to the contrary, Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., 
infra., and the decision of the trial court must be affirmed. 
The trial court correctly held that the game bird law permits 
the ownership and recapture of birds which are lawfully owned, 
because they are not "wildlife." 
IV. Rule 11 order striking the Affidavit of Appellant, and 
imposing sanctions, was within the discretion of the trial court. 
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises., 
Inc., infra.; Jeschke v. Willis, infra.. 
V. Sanctions should be imposed for continued bad faith 
litigation, Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., infra., misrep-
resentation of the Record herein and failure of counsel to heed 
his prior censure in Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., infra.. 
A R G U M E N T 
Gurley's main line of defense, viz., that he acted as a peace 
officer with "probable cause," was rejected by the trial court 
after a trial on the merits. Gurley never asserted peace officer 
conduct, in any event, until after summary judgment had been 
entered against him. Had he done so, the trial court determined, 
after hearing all of the evidence, including Gurley's own testi-
mony, that "probable cause" did not authorize Gurley to "seize" 
Nielson's bird pen (e.g., Br. 30), much less destroy it and the 
property therein. The trial court was correct, for this Court has 
repeatedly held that conduct consistent with lawful behavior cannot 
constitute "probable cause," e.g., State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 
85, 89-90 (Utah App. 1987) and subsequently held, emphatically, in 
State v. Beavers, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 39 (Utah App., decided 
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August 13, 1993) that "police cannot rely on reasonable suspicion 
as the basis for a warrantless entry" and that "entry was 
constitutionally impermissible even if probable cause existed," 
citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 (1971) ("no 
amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure"). 
There must be, in addition, "exigent circumstances" consisting of 
imminent physical harm or destruction of evidence. 
This Court cannot reach that question, however, for it is 
clearly without jurisdiction. 
Point I 
THIS APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION 
Notice of Appeal, a copy of which is attached at Addendum "B," 
was filed on February 26, 1993. Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, requires that the notice of appeal be filed within 
thirty (30) days following entry of final judgment. The Notice was 
thus untimely and jurisdictionally defective, having been filed 
more than thirty (30) days after final judgment was entered on 
January 7, 1993. No order enlarging the time for appeal had been 
secured, nor had a timely post-trial motion extending the time for 
appeal been filed. 
A. Appeal may not be Taken From an Amended Judgment. 
Counsel for Gurley acknowledged in a letter to Geoffrey J. 
Butler, Clerk of the Utah Supreme Court, dated January 20, 1993, 
that notice of appeal was necessary, but nevertheless failed to 
appeal for another thirty-seven (37) days. Appeal was then barred, 
final judgment having been entered fifty-one (51) days earlier. 
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Counsel indulges in calculated deception at Br. 12, in an 
attempt to salvage jurisdiction, by stating that appeal was not 
from the final judgment entered on January 7, 1993, but from the 
Amended Judgment entered by the Court on January 27, 1993. Further 
lack of candor and deception is revealed in the assertion that 
"[o]n January 21, 1993, defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment" and that "[o]n 
January 27, 1993, the Court entered its Amended Judgment." The 
motion was without any effect, having been withdrawn (R. 2 069), and 
could not delay the appeal time, in any event, for it was filed on 
January 21 and was untimely, being more than ten (10) days after 
final judgment entered on January 7. See Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
The amendment had no relation to Appellant's motion to set 
aside, does not represent a "final judgment" and is not appeal-
able. The amended judgment merely corrected a clerical error in 
which the word "costs," clearly awarded by the Memorandum Decision 
dated December 18, 1992 (R. 1908), was omitted from the final 
judgment entered on January 7, 1993. A copy of the Amended 
Judgment is attached hereto at Addendum "C". Comparison of it with 
the final judgment of January 7, attached at Addendum "D," will 
reveal that they are identical, save for the addition of the word 
"costs" in paragraph 6 on page 2. 
Utah and other courts have ruled many times that such minor, 
clerical corrections relate back to the date of entry of final 
judgment. E.g., Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 
268 (1947): 
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The rule of law enunciated by this court in these 
cases, is that, where a belated entry merely 
constitutes an amendment or modification not 
changing the substance or character of the 
judgment, such entry is merely a nunc pro tunc 
entry which relates back to the time the original 
judgment was entered, and does not enlarge the 
time for appeal . . . . (Citations omitted.) 
Accord., Federal Trade Com. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator 
Co., 344 U.S. 209 (1952) (fact that judgment has been re-entered 
or revised in an immaterial way does not toll time for appeal). 
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the 
parties litigant. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 
(Utah 1979). See also, In re Voorhees' Estate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 
366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
The United States Supreme Court revisited the issue in recent 
years and reaffirmed these precepts in Budinich v. Becton 
Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988): 
"A 'final decision' generally is one which ends 
the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing 
for the court to do but execute the judgment." A 
question remaining to be decided after an order 
ending litigation on the merits does not prevent 
finality if its resolution will not alter or moot 
or revise decisions embodied in the order. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Precise to the issues of this case, Becton Dickinson held that a 
subsequent award of costs does not affect the finality of a 
judgment. The court reviewed authorities that costs, including 
the award of attorney's fees, are not part of the merits of the 
action and held that 
This requires, we think, a uniform rule that an 
unresolved issue of attorney's fees for the 
litigation in question does not prevent judgment 
on the merits from being final. 486 U.S. 202. 
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A judgment nunc pro tunc cannot shorten the time for appeal. 
Utah State Bldg. Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 
P.2d 141 (1965). Conversely, mere correction of a clerical error 
cannot extend the time for appeal. Bach v. Caughlin, 508 F.2d 
303 (7th Cir. 1974). 
B. Notice of Appeal is Jurisdictional. 
This Court might excuse an inartful designation of the Judgment 
appealed from, but timeliness is jurisdictional. Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). 
[A]lthough a court may construe the Rules 
liberally in determining whether they have been 
complied with, it may not waive the jurisdic-
tional requirements of Rules 3 and 4, even for 
"good cause shown," if it finds that they have 
not been met. Id. at 316-217. 
The issue is identical with Dickinson v. Petroleum Corp., 
338 U.S. 507 (1950), where the controversy was tried and a decree 
entered on April 10, 1947. The trial court then determined rights 
of class members and awarded costs in a "final decree" dated 
August 3, 1948. Appeal from the latter decree was jurisdiction-
ally defective: 
We hold the decree of April 10, 1947, to have 
been a final one as to Petroleum and one from 
which it could have appealed and that its 
failure to appeal therefrom forfeits its right 
of review. Its attempt to review the earlier 
decree by appealing from the latter one is 
ineffective, and its appeal should be dismissed. 
Id. at 516. 
The file concerning this appeal leaves no doubt that Appel-
lant's counsel was well aware of the need to file a notice of 
appeal. Appellant had ample time following his January 20 letter 
to Mr. Butler to file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days 
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after January 7, 1993, as required by Rule 4, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, or to obtain an extension of time if that was 
appropriate or necessary, but did not do so. 
This Court cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely appeal. 
Nelson v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1993); Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 565 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 
1320 (1982). "Regardless of who raises the issue, we must dismiss 
a case if we determine we do not have jurisdiction." Maverick 
Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 
18 (Utah App., decided Sept. 7, 1993), citing Silva v. Department 
of Employment Sec, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990) (per cu-
riam); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah App. 1987) 
(per curiam). "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction 
it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-
Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). 
C. The Premature Notice was Defective. 
It is acknowledged at Br. 12 that notice of Appeal was filed, 
prematurely, on December 21, 1992, from the Memorandum Decision of 
Judge Young. (R. 1934.) Appellant advised the Clerk of the Utah 
Supreme Court by letter dated January 20, 1993 that "final 
judgment has not been entered" and that "a new notice of appeal 
2/ [may] need to be filed."—  No docketing statement was ever 
The premature notice explicitly relates to the Memorandum Decision of Judge Young dated 
December 18, 1992, and orders preceding it, and does not relate to any orders thereafter: 
Notice is hereby given that the defendant and appellant Dale Gurley . . . 
appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final judgment of the Honorable David 
S. Young entered in this matter on December 18, 1992. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment entered on December 18, 1992, 
as well as from all prior judgments . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
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f i l e d pursuant t o the Premature Notice and both the Docketing 
Statement herein and Appel lant ' s Addendum leave no doubt that the 
premature n o t i c e has been abandoned (viz., only the February 26, 
1993 Notice of Appeal i s included at Appel lant ' s Addendum 25) . 
The premature n o t i c e f i l e d on December 21, 1992 i s d e f e c t i v e , 
in any event , under Rule 3 ( d ) , Utah Rules of Appel late Procedure, 
for two reasons . F i r s t , Gurley purported t o appeal from a non-
appealable Memorandum Decis ion. Second, Gurley subsequently f i l e d 
a motion for recons iderat ion . Rule 4 ( b ) , Utah Rules of Appel late 
Procedure, c a t e g o r i c a l l y dec lares that a n o t i c e of appeal f i l e d 
pr ior t o a motion t o reconsider "shal l have no e f f e c t " and "a new 
no t i ce of appeal must be f i l e d . " 
Point I I 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
WAS COMPLIED WITH 
Gurley m i s s t a t e s , or misunderstands, the concept of govern-
mental immunity with h i s a s s e r t i o n s that "timely f i l i n g of a 
n o t i c e of claim i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n [ a l ] p r e r e q u i s i t e t o i n s t i t u t i n g 
l e g a l ac t ion against the State of Utah or one of i t s employees" 
Footnote 2 continued 
Arguments of Gurley in his opposition to the motion to dismiss appeal before the Supreme Court 
that Rule 4(c) provides that premature notice takes effect on entry of the final order are 
incorrect. Rule 4(c) applies when the correct order is appealed from, but notice is filed 
before the order is entered. 
The Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992 was not a "final judgment." Judge Young's 
Minute Entry entered simultaneously with the Memorandum Decision (R. 1907) directed that "the 
Plaintiff is requested to prepare consistent with the Memorandum Decision and the Record, formal 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment." Plaintiff did so, and final judgment was 
entered on January 7, 1993. There can be no doubt that a Memorandum Decision, leaving the 
formal entry of the form of judgment to be resolved, is not a "final order." A proceeding is 
not "final" until a judgment or order is entered ending the controversy. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). Cf. , Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah App. 
1989). Accord, Barney v. Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 
(Utah App. 1992). Premature notice of appeal is ineffective to confer appellate jurisdiction. 
DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah App., March 18, 1992) 
(notice of appeal filed before disposition of a post-judgment motion). The remedy for appeal 
from a proceeding which is not final is dismissal. A.J. Mackey Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 
P.2d 323 (Utah 1991). 
15 
(Br. 19) and that "Defendant is Immune from Suit." (Id. 22.) 
Neither proposition could be correct. State employees, like 
other citizens, finance homes, automobiles and other transactions, 
and are involved in automobile accidents and other torts, for 
which they, like other persons, may be subject to suit. They, and 
the State of Utah, like ordinary citizens, contract for 
construction, facilities and supplies, and they may be sued to 
enforce their bargain. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 
et seq., accommodates those obvious requirements by permitting 
suit against an employee for conduct not in "the performance of 
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority." E.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12. Wanton destruc-
tion of private property is not in the performance of duties or 
under color of authority, and the trial judge so held. Urging 
that Utah Admin. Code § R 608-11-3(C)(2) requires peace officers 
to "seize" illegal trapping devices is insufficient to satisfy the 
"color of authority" element, for the pen was not "illegal," Utah 
Admin. Code § R608-4-3 requires peace officers to make inquiry and 
Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1(1) requires DWR officers to follow "the 
same procedures as other peace officers." Repeated decisions of 
this Court impose a "warrants wherever possible" requirement. 
E.g., State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 148 (Utah App. 1991). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 further provides that immunity from 
suit is waived as to any action "arising out of contractual rights 
or obligations." Nielson's claims arise out of not one, but two, 
contracts consisting of his lease with the State of Utah and his 
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permit for a private wildlife farm. Said § 63-30-5 pointedly 
declares that such claims "shall not be subject to the require-
ments of Sections 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15 
or 63-30-19" — which is a litany for filing a notice of claim. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(3)(b) specifically declares 
that the Governmental Immunity act does not apply if "the employee 
acted or failed to act through fraud or malice." Malice, in other 
words, is not something the State is liable for because it is not 
within the scope of an employee's duties or within the course of 
his employment and therefore not "under color of authority." Two 
separate judges have found Gurley's conduct the product of actual 
malice, in three (3) separate orders. 
Furthermore, the defense is precluded by the order enjoining 
Gurley in No. 249 because of the plain holding in American Tierra 
Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah, 1992) that 
the Governmental Immunity Act has no application to equitable 
claims. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988) (Borthick 
II), is thus miscited at Br. 19. Borthick II plainly did not 
hold that "timely notice of claim is a jurisdiction[al] prerequi-
site to instituting legal action against the State of Utah or one 
of its employees." To the contrary, Justice Zimmerman categor-
ically held at 769 P.2d 251 that 
The Commissioners' argument [viz., that "in 
all suits against employees" the requirement of 
a notice of claim is a precondition to suit] 
runs directly counter to section 63-30-11's 
apparently plain statement to the opposite 
effect: "[S]ervice of the notice of claim upon 
the governmental entity is required only if 
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the entity has a statutory duty to indemnify 
such person.1' 
Justice Zimmerman further observed at 769 P.2d 249n.6 that Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-11 "also carries the negative implication . . . 
that service of notice on an employee 'is not a condition prece-
dent to the commencement of an action . . . against such person.'" 
Filing of notice of claim is therefore not a subject matter objec-
tion, even where required, and failure of Gurley to assert the 
defense prior to the entry of summary judgment constitutes a waiver. 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Borthick II is clearly distinguishable. It involved the 
question of whether allegations of "gross negligence" avoid the 
notice of claim requirement, following a 1983 amendment elimi-
nating "gross negligence" from Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (Supp. 
1979) . It has nothing to say — nothing at all — about the clear 
exemption of acts involving "malice" or claims arising out of 
contracts from the provisions of said Section 11. 
Borthick II reaffirmed and relied upon Madsen v. Borthick, 
658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) (Borthick I), which held at 630n.5 and 
63 3 that the Governmental Immunity Act grants "permission to sue 
government employees for 'gross negligence, fraud or malice.'" 
Thus Borthick I and II both hold that an employee may be sued, 
without the necessity of filing a notice of claim, in those 
circumstances permitted by the act. If there could be any doubt, 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) (contract 
action) held, contrary to Gurley's contention, that "the immunity 
is not absolute" because "the Act was structured such that immu-
18 
nity was granted generally and waived (and retained by 
exception to waiver) specifically." (Emphasis by the Court.) 
There plainly is no absolute obligation to file a notice of 
claim merely because Gurley is a government employee. Even if this 
Court were to conclude that notice of claim was necessary, such 
notice had been served on the Attorney General and DWR five (5) 
separate times by the time No. 249 was filed. (See note 1, 
supra.) The Governmental Immunity Act prescribes no form for the 
notice. The Complaint in No. 302 included all of the elements 
required for a notice and was served on both the Attorney General 
and DWR. They could have been afforded no better "notice," when 
No. 249 was filed, than the actual complaint that was to be filed. 
Point III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE CONTROVERTING THE 
TRIAL JUDGE'S CONCLUSIONS AND THEY MUST BE AFFIRMED 
Br. 25 through 40 resorts to a "scattergun," (if we may be 
indulged a pun) assault on the findings and conclusions of the 
trial judge, reminiscent of the rural adage that "if you throw 
enough [bleep] at 'em, some of it'll stick"! This Court need not 
pause over Gurley7s attack on the findings of the trial judge, 
however — and, indeed, has not been given any basis for doing so 
— for counsel has not furnished a single reference to the Record 
in support of his arguments. 
The evidence was clear, and uncontroverted that Nielson 
purchased the Chukar in the pen, and others in the vicinity which 
were being controlled by its "recall" features, from a licensed 
game farm the prior day. (See R. 21-22 and testimony of Derreld 
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Morris, who sold the birds to Nielson.) The trial judge repeat-
edly found, in his Partial Summary Judgment at R. 326, in his 
Memorandum Decision at R. 1915 and in his Findings and Conclusions 
at R. 1952 that the subject device was not a "trap," but a bird 
pen. (Derreld Morris, who operates a commercial game farm, so 
testified.) 
Gurley,s present counsel, Mr. Ferguson, is hard pressed to 
suggest anything incorrect about the trial judge's findings and 
conclusions in that regard, for they were in fact agreed to by 
Gurley's former counsel, Assistant Attorney General Stringham, who 
conceded during the summary judgment hearing before Judge Young 
that the recall pen was legal. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Now, would you take the position 
that they then have to buy birds every time they 
train because they have no ability to recapture 
the birds that they're using? 
MR. STRINGHAM: Well—and I can see the Court's 
point on that. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, [Gurley's contention] becomes 
absurd, doesn't it? 
MR. STRINGHAM: Yes, it does. 
JUDGE YOUNG: So [if training dogs is legal] they 
must have the right to maintain a recapture pen. 
MR. STRINGHAM: Fair enough. 
* * * * 
JUDGE YOUNG: In other words, it is not unlawful 
for Mr. Nielson to have had this pen for recap-
ture, with recapture cones, for the purpose of 
recapturing the bird he was using. 
MR. STRINGHAM: For the purpose of recapturing, I 
believe that's proper. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Then Mr. Nielson's motion for 
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summary judgment on that issue is granted. (See 
transcript of oral arguments on all outstanding 
motions on May 28, 1991 at 9-10, reproduced at 
Appellant's Addendum 144-145.) 
Judge Young then gave articulation to his rationale for hold-
ing that Gurley did not act under "color of authority" at Tr. 12: 
JUDGE YOUNG: I can't understand in this case 
why Mr. Gurley didn't make further inquiry. To 
me, it seems obvious that this was a pen on 
property that he knew, or should have known, was 
being used for training dogs. He apparently 
knew Mr. Nielson. I'm a little surprised that 
he did not make further inquiry on this. 
Positively offensive, coming from a veteran member of the Bar 
like Mr. Ferguson and in light of the foregoing, is his resort to 
unfairly maligning the distinguished trial judge at Br. 29n.3 
where it is stated that "the court declined to elaborate on its 
reasons" and at 46n.7 where it is stated that 
the trial court never ruled on the substance of 
the legal defenses and motions presented by 
defendant. Defendant was never able to get the 
court to rule on his Motion to Dismiss. The 
court refused to consider defendant's motions for 
summary judgment and Motion to Set Aside or 
Vacate the Partial Summary Judgment on the basis 
that defendant had "waived" these defenses. 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, supra., does in fact hold that 
defenses not raised prior to entry of summary judgment are waived, 
but the accusation is nevertheless incorrect. The Order on the 
Parties Pretrial Motions dated August 13, 1992 (R. 1706) ruled on 
the merits of each of Gurley's motions. Indeed, the transcript of 
hearings before Judge Young on May 28, 1991, quoted supra., and 
August 6, 1992, contained in Appellant's own Addendum at 54-93 and 
138-165, both reveal that Judge Young patiently elaborated his 
reasons and ruled upon each of Gurley's motions: 
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JUDGE YOUNG: . . . . Maybe it would be wise for 
us to go through those motions [of Gurley] and 
see what the court would do with each one of them. 
* * * * 
MR. FERGUSON: Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed in case 302. Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was denied in—it is 
denied but it was filed in 249. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Okay. Each of those will be denied. 
* * * * 
MR. FERGUSON: There was a Motion for Relief From 
Partial Summary Judgment filed in 3 02. 
* * * * 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right (after hearing counsel). 
I will allow that to stand, Mr. Ferguson. 
* * * * 
MR. FERGUSON: The Motion to Stay Execution was 
the other one. The motion for relief from Judge 
Moffat's order. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. That motion will be 
denied for relief from Judge Moffat's order. . . . 
* * * * 
MR. FERGUSON: And the final motion that I have 
filed is the Motion for Return of Garnished Funds 
based upon the filing of the bond. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. That motion will be 
denied. . . . Now, anything else? 
MR. FERGUSON: Those are all the motions that I 
filed. (Transcript of Hearing on Outstanding 
Motions, August 6, 1992 at 90-96, reproduced at 
Appellant's Addendum at 75-81.) 
Gurley's present counsel now advances at Br. 25-35 the very 
arguments Gurley's former counsel, Mr. Stringham, acknowledged 
were "absurd". 
A. Summary Judgment was Properly Entered. 
Arguments at Br. 26-30 and 32-35 concerning the entry of 
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Partial Summary Judgment are incorrect and ask this Court to 
ignore the modern view of summary judgment proceedings. 
1. Entry of Two Forms of Order was Proper. First of all, 
there was nothing irregular or improper about Judge Young entering 
two orders, or any other number he found necessary and proper. 
Gurley correctly notes that Judge Young was frustrated. His 
frustration grew out of the refusal of counsel for Gurley to agree 
on the form of an order, as the trial court had directed. Rather 
than do so, counsel for Gurley submitted a competing form of order 
in disregard of the clear provisions of Rule 4-504(1), Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration, that "counsel for the party or parties 
obtaining the ruling" shall submit the "proposed form of order." 
There being no inconsistency between the two forms of order (and 
counsel for Gurley suggests none), Judge Young ended the bickering 
by signing both orders. We submit that was a proper exercise of 
judicial discretion and an inspired way to deal with uncooperative 
counsel. 
2. The Trial Court Followed the Modern View of Summary 
Judgment Procedure. Rule 56(c) and (d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides: 
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. . . . 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. . . . 
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. 
If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the 
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
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at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by inter-
rogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain 
what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually 
and in good faith controverted. It shall there-
upon make an order specifying the facts that 
appear without substantial controversy, including 
the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing 
such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. . . . 
Contrary to urging of Gurley that a summary judgment must be 
based upon "evidence," Rule 56 requires only a "showing" which may 
be by affidavit, by interrogating counsel or by any other matter 
in the file. Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 
390 (Utah 1984) held "that an opponent of a motion for summary 
judgment must timely file responsive affidavits raising factual 
issues or risk the trial court's conclusion that there are no 
factual issues." 
The United States Supreme Court issued a trilogy of opinions 
in 1986, rejecting arguments that summary judgment must be based 
on "evidence" and giving the identical provisions of federal Rule 
56 expansive meaning in cases where there is no genuine issue of 
a material fact. See, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp. 106 S.Ct. 1348 (1986), Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242 (1986). Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987) adopted both Liberty Lobby, 
and Celotex. See also, Busch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987). 
In Celotex the High Court declared that "[w]e do not mean 
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that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that 
would be admissible at trial" (477 U.S. at 324) and pointedly held 
in Liberty Lobby that 
[WJhen a properly supported motion for summary 
judgment is made, the adverse party "must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." And, as we noted 
above, Rule 56(c) provides that the trial judge 
shall then grant summary judgment if there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and if the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. There is no requirement that the trial 
judge make findings of fact. (Citations omitted) 
477 U.S. 250. 
Accord., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 
3186 (1990). As Chief Justice Rhenquist held in Celotex: 
One of the principal purposes of the summary 
judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of 
factually unsupported claims or defenses, and 
we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
477 U.S. at 323-324. 
As Judge Greene observed in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.Supp. 
1537, 1540 (D. Utah 1992): 
Hearing and viewing the witnesses subject to 
cross-examination would not aid the determin-
ation if there are neither issues of credibil-
ity nor controversies with respect to the 
substance of the proposed testimony. The 
judge, as trier of fact, is in a position to 
and ought to draw his inferences without resort 
to the expense of trial. 
3. Finding Facts Without Genuine Dispute is the Function of 
Summary Judgment. Gurley's efforts to suggest impropriety in 
the entry of Partial Summary Judgment at Br. 26-30 are both 
duplicitous and contradictory. 
First, Gurley correctly states at Br. 28 that "the trial court 
has an obligation to clearly set forth the basis for its ruling 
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granting summary judgment," but then proceeds to argue that the 
trial judge erred because he did precisely that. The correct rule 
is not Rule 52(a), but Rule 56(d), supra, directing that the 
trial judge "make an order specifying the facts that appear 
without substantial controversy . . . and directing such further 
proceedings in the action as are just . . . ." The order proposed 
by Gurley's counsel correctly recited some legal issues that had 
been ruled upon, but did not define the facts and issues 
remaining. It could not be error, therefore, for the trial judge 
to enter, simultaneously, the order submitted by the prevailing 
party which did define the factual issues resolved and those 
remaining for trial. 
It is incorrectly stated that the trial court erred by making 
findings of fact, for Rule 56 directs that he do so when they are 
without genuine controversy. The two findings objected to by 
Gurley at Br. 32-33 — viz., that Gurley had reason to believe 
that the pen belonged to Nielson on September 8, 1990, and was 
familiar with the laws and regulations concerning possession of 
game birds — are without genuine controversy because they come 
directly out of Gurley7s own report attached to his Affidavit. 
(R. 416.) They were, moreover, admitted on interrogation of his 
counsel (see supra., p. 20) at the time of hearing, as directed 
by Rule 56. It cannot be argued, with any logic or consistency, 
that the trial judge could not conclude that those facts were 
without genuine controversy. 
Judge Young did not conclude "that Officer Gurley did not like 
dog trainers [and] . . . that Officer Gurley had acted mali-
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ciously," (Br. 33-34), at least not in his summary judgment. 
Those findings came later, in the trial on the merits. The 
summary judgment merely recited that there was an "inference" of 
malice, and made no such conclusion. 
4. Trial was not Limited to Damages. Finally, the trial 
court did not "conclude that the Partial Summary Judgment found 
liability against defendant as a matter of law" (Br. 36) or 
"restrict the ability of defendant to present factual defenses" 
concerning interference with contract rights and conversion. (Br. 
39.) The competing order presented by Gurley's counsel would have 
put the trial judge in that box, and may have been calculated to 
do so, but the order on Partial Summary Judgment is clear: 
8. The issues remaining for trial, within 
the meaning and intent of Rule 56(d), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, include the question 
of damages or other appropriate relief, includ-
ing the extent and nature of any defamatory 
statements concerning Plaintiff made by 
Defendant, and the elements of conversion, 
interference with contract rights and defama-
tion (but not including the defense of truth of 
any statements that Plaintiff violated the 
law), respectively. (R. 322-323.) 
B. The Elements of Conversion and Interference with Contract 
were Established. 
In the eventual trial, the trial court found, at R. 1946: 
5. The court determines that the facts estab-
lish the elements of conversion. 
6. The court determines that the facts estab-
lish the elements of interference with a 
contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease 
agreement with the State of Utah. 
It is incorrectly stated, therefore, that the trial court 
"restricted the ability of defendant to present factual defenses." 
(Br. 39.) To the contrary, no proof was ever proffered by Gurley 
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rebutting the showing made in support of summary judgment. 
Failing such a proffer, Nielson's showing was uncontroverted. 
The trial judge correctly applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS 
§ 223 as to the elements of conversion: 
A conversion may be committed by intentionally 
(a) dispossessing another of a chattel as 
stated in §§ 221 and 222; 
(b) destroying or altering a chattel as 
stated in § 226 
* * * * 
(g) refusing to surrender a chattel as stated 
in §§ 237-241. 
The facts establish conversion of all three of the foregoing 
types. 
There can be no doubt that Gurley's "dismantling" of 
Plaintiffs pen destroyed it, or altered it within the meaning of 
RESTATEMENT § 226. Indeed, Gurley stated in his report that his 
purpose was to render it inoperative. There is no need for 
Gurley to put the property to his own use, for his refusal to 
return it for more than one year amounts to a conversion. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 237: 
One in possession of a chattel as bailee or 
otherwise who, on demand, refuses without 
proper qualification to surrender it to another 
entitled to its immediate possession, is 
subject to liability for conversion. 
Comment g to § 237 explains that a defendant who "puts the 
plaintiff to the necessity of a lawsuit to recover his property, 
is clearly [guilty of] a conversion." 
The trial judge correctly applied RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 
766B as to interference with contract: 
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One who intentionally and improperly interferes 
with another's prospective contractual relation 
(except a contract to marry) is subject to 
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm 
resulting from loss of the benefits of the 
relation, [if] the interference consists of 
* * * * 
(b) preventing the other from acquiring or 
continuing the prospective relation. 
There is no authority for the assertion "that it is 
impossible for one agent of the State of Utah to commit the tort 
of intentional interference between Plaintiff and the State of 
Utah." (Br. 39.) Gurley was not even employed by the Division 
of Lands and Forestry, with whom Nielson contracted. Being an 
employee of DWR does not make Gurley "a party to a contract" 
(Id. 40) between Nielson and Gurley7s employer. Does Mr. 
Ferguson mean, really, that Nielson could sue the Clerk of this 
Court, who is also a state employee, for specific performance of 
the lease agreement? Nielson v. Jacobsen, 699 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1983) (Br. 40) has nothing to say about such matters. 
C. No Evidence was Excluded at Trial. 
Urging at Br. 39 that the trial judge excluded relevant 
evidence at the time of trial is also incorrect. Judge Young 
explained in the dialogue quoted at Br. 36-37 the findings on 
summary judgment that must be overcome, but Gurley never prof-
fered any evidence calculated to do so. There is no suggestion 
of any evidence that was excluded other than the claim at Br. 39 
that Judge Young did not "wish to have further testimony" about 
whether the pen was on Nielson's leased land. That comment 
merely reflected the trial judge's observation that, because the 
29 
surrounding land was publ i c , i t would make no d i f f erence i f that 
were s o . (See Judge Young's comments quoted at Br. 38.) 
J . Russel Manning, who Gurley quotes at Br. 37, was in fac t 
allowed t o t e s t i f y . His testimony stands for nothing, however, 
for the foundation wi tnes s , Forest Off icer Dave G r i f f e l , was 
forced t o admit that there was no bird pen at the s i t e he asked 
Manning t o survey. Nielson t e s t i f i e d (see % 29 at R. 1832) that 
G r i f f e l ' s assumption of the pen's l o c a t i o n was on the wrong 
s ide of Forest Road 601, more than 1,000 f e e t from i t s correct 
3 / 
location.—7 I t had been removed, moreover, many months pr ior 
to the Manning survey by Nie lson, with the help of Mr. Don Burgi 
(former Chief Deputy Clerk, Third D i s t r i c t Court). (Id.) 
Manning's c e r t i f i c a t i o n that he surveyed a "structure" (which 
he never i d e n t i f i e d as a bird pen) " i d e n t i f i e d for me by Dave 
Gri f fe l" (see Appel lant ' s Addendum 508) was p o i n t l e s s and Judge 
Young therefore sa id he did not wish t o hear more of i t . 
D. Appellant has not Marshaled the Evidence Concerning 
"Malice". 
Gurley's arguments, those against the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f inding 
The undisputed testimony was that the pen was located near Stepladder Trough, correctly 
shown on Defendant's Exhibit 11, reproduced at Appellant's Addendum p. 515 and to the east of 
forest road #601. The forest map reproduced at Appellant's Addendum p. 495 did not go into 
evidence, but is important because it shows that Griffel assumed that the pen was far from 
Stepladder Trough and to the west of Forest Road #601. Thus, Griffel, who "identified" the site 
for Manning (see Appellant's Addendum p. 508), erroneously located it by more than 1,000 feet. 
The testimony quoted at Brief of Appellant 37 acknowledges that Manning merely fixed the "site 
. . . identified by Dave Griffel" on topographic maps and ariel photography. He "did not use 
scientific instruments or anything of that nature" (viz, surveying equipment) and if the site 
he located was 700 feet from the nearest corner of the state lands (see Appellant's Addendum p. 
508) it proves that it was actually on state land leased by Nielson. 
The issue is a "red herring," in any event, for Griffel testified that there was nothing 
improper about the pen being on forest land, even if that were so. Trappers regularly put their 
devices on forest land, and need no permit to do so. Nielson had the consent of the forest 
ranger when he originally put it where he did and promptly removed the pen, when requested to do 
so (see WI 22, 28-29 at R. 1833, 1832, 1834). 
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of malice in particular, disregard Rule 11(e)(2), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and his duty to marshal the evidence. 
The trial court had before it the sworn statement of Deputy 
Sheriff Dan Taylor, a fellow peace officer to whom Gurley 
admitted his malice (R. 50) and Br. 47 acknowledges that Nielson 
presented "testimony from [7] witnesses claiming to have reason 
to believe that Officer Gurley dislike[d] dog trainers" and 
"letters written by others at the Division of Wildlife Resources 
which he used to argue that Gurley had personal malice." Not a 
single word of that evidence is presented in either Brief of 
Appellant or Appellant's Addendum. Neither does Gurley offer a 
single word of evidence to the contrary, relying instead on his 
own bland denial. For that matter, there is not a single 
reference, in the entirety of Brief of Appellant or Appellant's 
Addendum to the Record and no reason is offered why the trial 
judge could not believe those who testified to Gurley's malice 
and disbelieve his self-serving denial. 
An Appellant who challenges the trial court's findings of 
fact must marshal the evidence. E.g., Sparrow v. Tayco 
Construction Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah App., decided Feb. 
4, 1993): 
. . . [I]n challenging the court's findings 
regarding the parties' intent, Tayco must marshal 
the evidence supporting these findings and then 
show how the evidence and the reasonable infer-
ences drawn therefrom are legally insufficient to 
support the findings. . . . 
Here, the court relied on substantial 
evidence to support its findings . . . . Because 
Tayco has not marshaled the evidence and because 
the court relied on substantial evidence, we 
affirm the court's finding . . . . 
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See also, State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah App., decided 
April 22, 1993): 
. . . . it is well settled that in order to 
"raise a challenge based on insufficiency of the 
evidence, the appellant must marshal all evidence 
supporting the trial court's conclusion. Then 
the appellant must show how the marshaled evi-
dence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is legally insufficient to support the 
trial court's conclusion." If the appellant 
fails to do so, we assume the trial court's 
findings are adequately supported by the record. 
In the case at bar, not only does Gray fail 
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial 
court's denial of her motion to dismiss, but she 
does not even marshal the evidence in opposition 
to it, instead simply rearguing her motion to 
dismiss without any reference to the record in 
this case. Such is plainly insufficient to meet 
our marshaling requirements. . . . Accordingly, 
Gray's argument that the trial court improperly 
denied her motion to dismiss fails. (Citations 
omitted.) 
It is not for Nielson to marshal the testimony of, e.g., 
Michael Hansing (Tr. 156), who testified that Gurley threatened 
that he would use his authority to prevent dog training, or game 
biologist William Galster (Tr. 126), to whom Gurley vowed that he 
would prevent dog trials in the Vernon area. Gurley must marshal 
that evidence and explain why it does not support the findings. 
E. The Gurley Affidavit may not be Relied Upon. 
There was no proper basis in the Record, surely not at the 
time of summary judgment, for Gurley's claims of peace officer 
conduct, his claims that the device was a "trap," or that the bird 
therein was wild. The only support offered for those statements 
at, e.g., Br. 18, 31, 33, 41, 42 and 47 is the Affidavit of 
Gurley . Reference to the Gurley Affidavit is improper, however, 
for Judge Moffat ordered it stricken. 
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Mr. Ferguson and his predecessors never furnished a new 
affidavit or other showing, properly certified as required by Rule 
11. The reason is obvious: Mr. Ferguson and his predecessors 
knew that the Affidavit was a pack of falsehoods, as Judge Moffat 
concluded, and to certify it would subject them, personally, to 
the sanctions of Rule 11. (See Point IV, infra.) 
The Court's attention is invited to the fact that the 
Affidavit of Dale Gurley at Appellant's Addendum 516 is not the 
Gurley Affidavit at R. 416 but a copy of a document filed before 
Judge Greene in the United States District Court. It was referred 
to at the time of trial in aid to Gurley's testimony but was not 
before the trial judge in connection with summary judgment or the 
subsequent motion to set aside the summary judgment. Thus, 
summary judgment and subsequent motions are without any showing, 
of any description, supporting Gurley's defense. 
F. Gurley Misreads Utah's Game Bird Law. 
Contrary to the urging of Gurley at Br. 3 0-32 that the bird 
pen was a "trap," that it had any "incriminating character" 
related to "protected wildlife" or that "exigent circumstances" 
required its destruction, the trial court recognized, correctly, 
that the trapping regulations relate only to fur bearing animals 
and that an entirely different statutory scheme governs game 
birds. (See Conclusion 2, R. 1947; Conclusions 2-5, R. 323, 324, 
325.) Gurley's argument is fundamentally flawed for at least five 
(5) basic reasons. 
First, Privately Owned Game Birds are not "Protected." The 
game bird code plainly permits private ownership of birds acquired 
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from a legal source (viz., a game farm). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-17-2 provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to take any birds 
not held in private ownership legally 
acquired . . . . (Emphasis added.) 
The testimony of Derreld Morris established that Nielson purchased 
the bird the day before. The Proclamation for the Possession of 
Live Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § R608-4-3, reproduced 
at Addendum "A," allows their possession pursuant to a permit 
(which Nielson's Affidavit f 20, R. 1835 established that he had) 
and further provides: 
A certificate of registration IS NOT required 
for a person to acquire live game birds for the 
purpose of training dogs . . . provided the 
birds are banded, are not held for more than 60 
days, and a bill of sale from a legal source is 
in possession. (Emphasis in original.) 
Representations at, e.g., Br. 13-14, 31 that Gurley had any 
belief that the pen, or the bird within it, had any incriminating 
character are absurd (as the trial judge observed, and Mr. 
Stringham agreed) when considered with the foregoing regulation. 
With knowledge that dog training with live game birds was legal 
and in progress on the subject lands, Gurley confiscated bands 
clearly marked "dog trial." 
Second, Pen Raised Birds are not "Wildlife.m "Wildlife" is 
defined at Utah Code. Ann. § 23-13-2(39) as "any species of 
vertebrate animal life except feral animals generally living 
in a state of nature." (Emphasis added.) 
Under any view of the facts, the bird in the pen, acquired 
the previous day from a licensed game farm, was not "living in a 
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state of nature" and could not, therefore, be "wildlife." Its 
owner could therefore "take" it under the laws and regulations 
relating to game birds, including by killing and eating it (as 
suppliers of commercial restaurants do) or by "trapping," as game 
farms do when they catch one for sale. If that were not so, the 
operation of a zoo or aviary would be impossible. Moreover, 
birds outside of the pen which had also been purchased were 
either "possessed" pursuant to the Proclamation for the Posses-
sion of Live Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § R608-4, by 
virtue of their being controlled by the recall pen, or they had 
"escaped" and thus "reverted to the wild," in which event they 
are "feral." In either event, they are not "protected wildlife" 
and are subject to recapture. 
Third, the Trapping Regulations Relate Only to Fur Bearing 
Animals. Urging at Br. 30 that "[t]raps and other trapping 
devices used in taking any wildlife must be permanently marked or 
tagged with the registered number of the trapper using them" 
ignores that the trapping provisions at Utah Code Ann. § 23-18-1, 
et seg., apply only to "wildlife" and to "furbearers." Game 
birds are governed by entirely different provisions at Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-17-4, et seg. 
Obviously, any device could be a "trap" if, but only if, so 
used. A deer fence surrounding a rancher's haystack clearly 
could be a trap, if used to keep wild animals in, but is merely a 
fence when used to keep them out. So too with game birds. Utah 
Admin. Code § R608-4-2(7), reproduced at Addendum "A," defines a 
"private wildlife farm or aviculture installation" as "[a]n 
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enclosed place such as, but not limited to, a pen or aviary, where 
privately-owned game birds are propagated or kept and which 
restricts the birds from escaping into the wild." (Emphasis 
added.) Nothing prohibits allowing them to return to the pen. 
Gurley's argument, if it were adopted by this Court, would mean 
that Tracy Aviary could not recapture its pheasants when they get 
out of their pen and mingle with ducks at the pond and Hogle Zoo 
could not reclaim its wild turkeys when they fly over the fence. 
Recall pens, which allow privately-owned birds to reenter, but 
restricts their escape, are thus plainly "aviculture 
4/ installations" and not "traps."—' The trial court correctly 
recognized and applied that distinction. 
Fourth, Utah Law Declares it Lawful to Recall Game Birds 
Lawfully Owned. Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2 (37) plainly provides 
that "trapping" means "taking protected wildlife" and subdivision 
(35), defines "taking" as meaning, inter alia, to "trap." 
Nielson's pen was operated pursuant to a lease and private game 
farm permit. Thus the declaration at Utah Code Ann. § 23-17-2 
that it is not illegal to "take" birds "held in private ownership 
legally acquired" means, necessarily, that it is not illegal to 
"trap" privately owned game birds, acquired from a lawful source. 
Fifth, Accidential Trapping is Legal. Even if the trapping 
regulations governing furbearers could be considered as having any 
The argument at Brief of Appellant that the pen was "indiscriminate in what animals it 
was capable of trapping" and "capable of trapping not only chukars but any other wildlife that 
happened to enter it" is incorrect because it ignores the facts of nature. Only birds of the 
same covey as the bird in the pen would be attracted to it and enter through the "recall 
cones." That is the purpose for leaving one "call bird" in the pen. 
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application, they plainly provide at Utah Admin. Code § R608-11-
3(C)(4) that "accidental trapping" is not illegal if the trapped 
animal is promptly released. Gurley's counsel fails to advise 
this Court of that provision and, contrary to his arguments 
advanced elsewhere, nothing limits it to "registered" trapping 
devices. 
The "trapping" pejorative, which is Gurley's only line of 
defense, is thus a mere "red herring." The key to application of 
the Utah Fish and Game Code, including the seizure provision at 
Utah Code Ann § 23-20-1(3), is the term "wildlife." One is not a 
"trapper" unless he is taking "protected wildlife." 
Point IV 
GURLEY#S "PERJURY" WAS PROPERLY STRICKEN 
It is correctly stated at Br. 41 that Judge Moffat ordered 
Gurley's Affidavit stricken, in its entirety. Incorrect, however, 
are assertions that it was stricken because it was perjury 
(although Judge Moffat did so conclude) or that Judge Moffat 
awarded "attorneys' fees." The Affidavit was stricken because 
counsel could not represent it to be in good faith, following 
reasonable investigation, as required by Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure ("Rule 11" herein). 
Rule 11 was amended in 1985 to add to the former requirement 
that every "pleading" be signed by an attorney of record, a re-
quirement that every "motion or other paper" also include such a 
signature: 
Every pleading, motion and other paper of a 
party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one attorney of record in 
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his individual name who is duly licensed to 
practice in the state of Utah. . . . The 
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the 
best of his knowledge, information, and belief 
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact . . . If a pleading, motion 
or other paper is not signed, it shall be 
stricken unless it is signed promptly after 
the omission is called to the attention of the 
pleader or movant. (Emphasis added.) 
Rule 7 was amended at the same time to provide that the rules 
applicable to "signings" will also apply to all "other papers." 
A. Rule 11 Requires Responsibility by Counsel for Every Filing. 
Those familiar with the litigation process know that support-
ing documents, like an affidavit, are frequently not signed by 
counsel, but the Rule is clear that they "shall be stricken" if 
not signed promptly when "the omission is called to the attention 
of the pleader." Nielson invoked the "other paper" clause of the 
Rule by informing Gurley's counsel that the Affidavit was false. 
When they refused to withdraw it, or certify that it was in good 
faith, after reasonable inquiry, Judge Moffat ordered it stricken 
and noted, in the process, that it was "riddled with untruths." 
Judge Moffat was clearly correct, for the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the amended rule applies to affidavits 
filed with the Court, in addition to formal pleadings. Business 
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises., Inc., Ill 
S. Ct. 922, 935 (1991). The High Court gave literal effect to the 
Rule's requirement that "every . . . paper" filed with the court 
be accompanied by the attorney's certification. 
Rule 11 is "aimed at curbing abuses of the 
judicial system." To this end, it sets up a 
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means by which litigants certify to the court, by 
signature, that any papers filed are well 
founded. . . . Sentence [1] states that where a 
party is represented by counsel, the party's 
attorney must sign any motion, pleading, or other 
paper filed with the court . . . . Sentence [6] 
dictates that where a required signature is 
missing and the omission is not corrected 
promptly, the document will be stricken. 
(Citation omitted.) 
B. Sanctions were Properly Imposed on Gurley. 
There can be no doubt that sanctions were properly imposed on 
Gurley, even though Nielson made no request that his attorneys be 
sanctioned (because they refused to sign the offending Affidavit). 
The Business Guides case, supra., applied the "other paper" 
language to an affidavit signed by a party and emphatically 
disposed of any contention that a represented party who signs is 
relieved of or subject to different standards under Rule 11: 
This reading [viz., exempting a represented 
party's affidavit from Rule 11] is inconsistent 
with both the language and the purpose of Rule 
11. . . . "When a party is represented by 
counsel, it is unnecessary, but not improper, 
for the represented party to sign as well." 
Accordingly, sentence [5] declares that the 
signature of a party conveys precisely the same 
message as that of an attorney: "The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certifi-
cate by the signer that the signer has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that . . . it 
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law" (emphasis by the Court). It seems 
plain that the voluntary signature of a 
represented party, no less than the mandatory 
signature of an attorney, is capable of 
violating the Rule. (Citations omitted.) 
In Jeschke v. Willis, 841 P.2d 202, 205 (Utah App. 1991) 
Gurley's former counsel, Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham, 
urged that in analogous circumstances sanctions should be imposed 
against former Attorney General Robert Hansen for the following 
reasons: 
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Hansen was on notice that Jeschke made various 
misrepresentations during his deposition 
regarding his injuries and the damage to his 
truck. Hansen was shown photographs and 
documents from a prior rear-end collision that 
Jeschke had been involved in. The evidence 
established that Jeschke's claims were meritless, 
and this evidence was easily accessible to Hansen. 
This Court adopted Mr. Stringham's argument and held that "Rule 11 
requires an attorney to make a reasonable inquiry as to the facts 
and law before signing and filing a document." We submit that 
applying the same holding herein was correct, for the language of 
Rule 11 is plain and explicit and makes imposition of sanctions 
for breach of that standard mandatory: 
. . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is 
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose 
upon the person who signed, a represented party, 
or both, an appropriate sanction, which may in-
clude an order to pay the other party or parties 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or 
other paper, including a reasonable attorneys 
fee. (Emphasis added.) 
C. The Order to Strike was Proper, Counsel Having Declined 
Nielson's Offer to Mitigate. 
Cases decided under the federal rule have held that a party 
seeking sanctions has a duty to mitigate damages by resolving such 
questions by the least expensive alternative. E.g., Brown v. 
Capitol Air, Inc., 797 F.2d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 1986); Michigan 
Nat'l Bank v. Kroger Co., 619 F.Supp. 1149 (E.D. Mich. 1985). 
Nielson therefore considered it prudent, and consistent with 
the mitigation requirements to resolve the problem by invoking the 
language of Rule 11 that "[e]very pleading, motion, and other 
paper . . . shall be signed by at least one attorney of record" 
before resorting to the sanctions provision of the Rule. Multiple 
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letters were directed to Attorney General Van Dam and his 
deputies, copies of which were attached to the motion, to satisfy 
the implicit requirement that the offending party be notified and 
given an opportunity to comply voluntarily before bringing a Rule 
11 motion. See, Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., 836 F.2d 866, 
880 (5th Cir. 1988); Matthews v. Freedman, 128 F.R.D. 194, 196 
(E.D. Pa. 1989). Gurley's counsel refused to either withdraw the 
Affidavit or certify it as the Rule requires. Rule 11 provides 
that the pleading shall then be stricken: 
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader or movant. 
D. The Affidavit was Perjury, Compounded. 
There can be no doubt that the opinion of Judge Moffat that 
Gurley's Affidavit (R. 416) was "riddled with untruths" was correct. 
To state that "a copy of [the citation] is attached," when it is the 
"Defendent's [sic] copy" (see lower left hand corner of the phony 
citation) V „ 
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'" 114020 JUVtl AOULt 
TM1 DCMNOAJlT I I Hi M i * « V t « 
«Of MSI TO AmAA Mi TM«i 
-ftgrf*, Cfeh" 
--— f • ***»«» 1»»+*H 
H M COUMT U t l OMIV 
coNvtcnaivfoaMiTiMt 
Q ^ * M * H 
fUArmomKi 
QOMAV O 
DEFENDEHT C n 
VTANtTATIOIVMJtOMOfWIlOUHMiOUf fyftJ +X*f**£f\\ 
STATE OF UTAH Plaintiff. VS. T W > y . 
R*i*im/t ^n~j(u^J\ 
*duiu*i ynz JfL Vhrflfi* 
f^mUmmalf l*0*t»Um*mm. IV«^HM»» | t « « ^ » M * l i n n * * " 
\%*vf(4 
7?o 
gjr« 
2*-.»»-«l 
trT, > © ' 
-*=L 
I I M~l » M 
T*f « N V I «MMIO OfPfMOANT If CMAROI0 W f N f o t A T I M —. ^kP^'^^Z}\ W * * ' * " * 
"Tooth 
NtCT^UHM^^.cf iWfl> i . t t fa4WA*Al6>Akrtowti i< M > . / 
41 
could not have been "served" — is a blunder of such enormity that 
it removes any possibility that the statement was advanced in good 
faith or with the care which should attend either a statement under 
oath or a solemn act like charging one with a crime. Stating that 
"I issued a citation," when there was none, cannot be dismissed as a 
mere "error." 
The perjury, moreover, was not confined to "one of the state-
ments . . . to the effect that a citation had been 'issued7 and 
'mailed to7 Nielson." (Br. 41.) Representations that Gurley did 
not know who the pen belonged to, did not destroy it, did not 
observe game farm feeding and watering systems and did not release 
the bird are inconsistent with his own attached report reciting 
those matters. The phony "citation" lists a fictitious court 
(there is no "6th Circuit Court" in "Tooele, Utah"—Tooele is the 
Third Circuit Court); has no direction to appear not "sooner than 
five days or later than 14 days" as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-19(2); contains information such as Nielson's address and 
employment which Gurley admitted that he copied from the Summons 
served on him after the date when the phony "citation" supposedly 
was "issued"; falsely states that the "Dated Notice Issued [was] 
9/13/90." Moreover, the signature of Dale Gurley on the phony 
"citation," which then became part of the official records of the 
State of Utah, falsely certifies to each of these matters. There 
are other falsehoods about the bird being wild, no one being present 
and not knowing the purpose of the pen which were obvious to Judge 
Moffat. There is no possibility a seasoned peace officer like 
Gurley, with more than twenty (20) years of experience, could have 
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made such mistakes unintentionally. 
E. There was no Award of "Attorneys' Fees." 
It is incorrectly stated that Judge Moffat awarded "attorney's 
fees to a pro se litigant," (Br. 41.) Judge Moffat's Order, which 
is at R. 1536, clearly awards a sanction equivalent to the value of 
Nielson's time required to prove the perjury. It is merely coin-
cidental that Nielson is also a lawyer. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the amount of sanctions is 
discretionary with the trial court. See, Rimensburger v. 
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah App. 1992); Taylor v. Estate of 
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah App. 1989). That amount may, in the 
discretion of the trial court, be measured by the expenses incurred 
through loss of professional time. Rule 11 is explicit that 
sanctions "may include an order to pay the other party or parties 
the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred . . . ." The Rule 
neither says, nor implies, "except when the party is a lawyer or 
pro se." 
The "no attorney's fees to a pro se litigant" argument is but 
another bid to mislead, in any event, for Nielson was not a "pro 
se litigant." His complaint was filed pro se, but he was repre-
sented by Mary Lou Godbe, Esq. in the summary judgment proceedings 
and by the undersigned Daniel Darger, Esq. at the time of trial and 
in this appeal. Shall this Court rule that if a lawyer ever assists 
in his own representation he is thereafter to be denied due process? 
Point V 
COUNSEL SHOULD BE SANCTIONED UNDER RULE 33 
The persistent effort of Gurley's counsel to obfuscate, and 
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make difficult the work of this Court was a matter the Supreme 
Court directed be considered for an award of Rule 33 sanctions. 
Coupled with the continued urging of Gurley's perjury, continu-
ation of the bad faith litigation determined by Judge Young 
(including, in particular, gratuitous maligning of a fellow 
professional with the "trap" pejorative), and this Court's 
observation in Gurley I that "Gurley's misconduct is disturbing 
and may have warranted sanctions" (851 P.2d 1204), decisions of 
this Court make imposition of further sanctions mandatory. 
A. Counsel's Misconduct Herein Merits Sanctions. 
Counsel has disregarded the clear rule on appeal, surely known 
to experienced counsel such as Mr. Ferguson and WILLIAMS & HUNT 
that in appellate proceedings the "statement of facts" must begin 
with the findings of the trial court. Markowitz & Co. v. Toledo 
Metropolitan Housing, 608 F.2d 699, 704 (6th Cir. 1979) (factual 
determinations of the district judge "must always be the starting 
place in any statement of facts for appellate review"). Accord, 
Sparrow v. Tayco Construction Co., 846 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 
App., decided Feb. 4, 1993). 
Mr. Ferguson has not furnished this Court with a single 
reference to the Record — not one — and refuses to even acknow-
ledge the findings of fact of the trial court. Mr. Ferguson 
presents, instead, a detailed recitation of the misrepresentations 
of the Gurley Affidavit, presenting them as "facts" even though 
they were ordered stricken by Judge Moffat after he found the 
Affidavit "riddled with untruths." 
Rather than refer to the Record, counsel for Gurley cites his 
44 
own Addendum. This Court surely knows that an "addendum" contem-
plates a "pamphlet" collecting documents in the Record counsel 
wishes to call to the attention of the Court. Gurley's "addendum" 
goes far beyond the contemplation of the rules and includes items 
which are not even a part of the Record. We might find that 
unobjectionable, for they are authentic, but the manner in which 
they are presented and numbered as if the document was the 
Record seems calculated to mislead. 
Many courts have held it misconduct concerning the appellate 
process to misstate the findings of the trial court. Williams v. 
Leach, 938 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1991). Cf., DCD Programs, 
Ltd. v. Leighton, 846 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1988): 
A court should not have to pore over an 
extensive record as an alternative to relying 
on counsel7s representations. The court relies 
on counsel to state clearly, candidly, and 
accurately the record as it in fact exists. 
Reciting matters such as the "trapping" pejorative as "facts," 
when they have no basis in the record, is conduct unbecoming a 
lawyer. In re Disciplinary Action Boucher, 837 F.2d 869, 871 
(9th Cir. 1988): 
The burden of ascertaining the true state of 
the record would be intolerable if misrepre-
sentation was common. . . . In part for his 
reason, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
28(a)(3) requires the appellants7 brief to 
contain a statement of facts "with appropriate 
references to the record." Counsel's profes-
sional duty "requires scrupulous accuracy in 
referring to the record." . . . Failure to 
comply with the admonition of rule 28(a)(3) can 
result in sanctions. (Citations omitted.) 
B. Continued Urging of Gurley's Perjury and Misuse of 
"Trapping" Regulations Merits Sanctions. 
This Court recently affirmed a trial court's award of Rule 11 
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sanctions for pursuing a frivolous claim in Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 224 Utah Adv. Rep, 35 (Utah App. , decided October 
25, 1993), and held, further, that pursuit of the same frivolous 
claim on appeal required the imposition of further sanctions under 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Gurley's counsel continues to urge this Court to rely upon an 
Affidavit which Judge Moffat has determined was perjury and 
ordered stricken, in its entirety, and which this Court found 
"disturbing" in Gurley I. Counsel attempts to minimize the 
perjury, urging that merely "[o]ne of the statements in the 
affidavit to the effect that a citation had been 'issued7 and 
'mailed to' Nielson is in error." (Br. 41.) Judge Young found 
that ploy to be "bad faith litigation" and awarded additional 
sanctions in the form of attorney's fees. 
Counsel continues, further, to urge an untenable and illogical 
interpretation of the "trapping" regulations. Any fair minded 
reading by one schooled in the law would lead to the conclusion 
that they apply only to furbearers, and have no application, in 
any event, to "inadvertent" trapping. Yet Mr. Ferguson advances 
his untenable argument, and states as a "fact" that the pen was a 
"trap," without the candor of even advising this Court that there 
is an "inadvertent trapping" exception. 
Under the common requirement of Rule 11, Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, it is held that sanctions are appropriate where 
the pleading is "legally unreasonable, or without legal 
foundation." In re Grantham Bros., 922 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.), 
cert, denied sub. nom., Needier v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 112 S.Ct. 
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94 (1991). Numerous authorites hold similar conduct violative of 
Rule 11. Cf., In re Anderson, 128 B.R. 850, 856 (D.R.I. 1991) 
(Rule 11 violated when minimal research would have revealed that 
legal position was without merit); Hayes and Son Body Shop, Inc. 
v. United States Trustee, 124 B.R. 66, 68 (W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Rule 
11 violated when unreasonable interpretation of statute urged). 
The leading case of Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of New 
York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985), held that 
. . . sanctions shall be imposed against any 
attorney . . . when it appears that a pleading 
has been interposed for any improper purpose, or 
where, after reasonable inquiry, a competent 
attorney could not form a reasonable belief that 
the pleading is warranted by existing law or a 
good faith argument for the extension, modifi-
cation or reversal of existing law. (Emphasis by 
the court.) 
C. Prior Censure of Mr. Ferguson by the Supreme Court Makes 
Sanctions Particularly Appropriate. 
Mr. Ferguson's extreme liberty with the facts and law herein 
is not isolated, but is his chronic practice. That Mr. Ferguson 
is an "old hand" at lack of candor, when it will aid the cause of 
partisan advocacy, is demonstrated by his censure for that very 
practice by the Utah Supreme Court. See Error v. Western Home 
Ins. Co., 756 P.2d 1077, 1083 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), where Justice Zimmerman wrote of Mr. Ferguson: 
. . . I write only to comment on a troubling fact 
not expressly mentioned by the Chief Justice. 
In his brief [Mr. Ferguson] . . . . cited 
several cases [but] most of the supposedly 
supporting decisions relied on by [Mr. Ferguson] 
have been overruled or otherwise departed from 
within their own jurisdictions. See footnote 2 
of the Chief Justice's opinion. 
All counsel filing briefs with this or any 
other court owe the court a duty to assure that 
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stated propositions of law [and, we submit, of 
fact] are correct and that cases cited are still 
good authority and are properly used. See 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State 
Bar, rule 3.3 (effective Jan. 1, 1988). I note 
this particular instance of questionable 
statements of law and questionable use of 
authority as a reminder to all lawyers of their 
obligation of candor toward the tribunal, an 
obligation that should not be subordinated to the 
interests of zealous advocacy. 
The prior censure of Mr. Ferguson by the Utah Supreme Court, 
it is submitted, is particularly important. We submit that the 
Supreme Court's direction that this Court consider the matter of 
sanctions was, or may have been, with an eye to counsel's prior 
censure in the Error case, and that Mr. Ferguson has failed to 
correct his practices. We submit that it is important, as well, 
to consider that the Utah Supreme Court has held that an attorney 
who acts to shield his client's perjury does so under penalty of 
severe sanctions. In re King, 322 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1958). 
This Court's recent decision in Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 
224 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36-37 (decided October 25, 1993) stands as 
an eloquent and stinging condemnation of the very practices herein: 
A frivolous appeal is one that is "not grounded 
in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, 
or reverse existing law." Further, it is "[o]ne 
in which no justifiable question has been pre-
sented and appeal is readily recognizable as 
devoid of merit in that there is little prospect 
that it can ever succeed." (Citations omitted.). 
This Court awarded attorney fees and double costs in Schoney 
because "we see no good faith argument to extend, modify or 
reverse existing law." We submit that it should do so herein. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In 
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the alternative, the decision of the trial court should be 
affirmed. In either event, damages for bad faith litigation 
should be awarded against Appellant, including attorneys fees and 
double costs, and sanctions imposed against Appellant's attorney. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of December, 1993. 
Daniel B. Darger v 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEE were mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
Cf /*-
this / day of December, 1993 to: 
Dennis C Ferguson, Esq. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
*fs&et <ZAL' 
(0013/0019/0069) 
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23-13-2. Definition*. 
As used in this title: 
* * * 
(11) "Feral" means an animal which is nor-
mally domesticated but ha* reverted to the wild. 
* * * 
113) "Furbearer" means fpecies of the 
Uabhariscidae, Canidae, Felidae, Muatehdae, and 
Castondae families, except coyote and cougar. 
* * * 
(24) "Person" means an individual, associa-
tion, partnership, government agency, corpora-
tion, or an agent of the foregoing. 
* * * 
(28) "Private wildlife farm" means an enclosed 
place where privately owned birds or furbearers 
are propagated or kept and which restricts the 
birds or furbearers from. 
(a) commingling with wild birds or 
furbearers; and 
lb) escaping into the wild. 
* * * 
(31 > ia) "Protected wildlile" means wildlife as 
defined in Subjection (43), except as pro-
vided in Subsection (b) 
(b) "Protected wildlife" does not include 
coyote, field mouse, gopher, ground squitrel, 
jack rabbit, muskrat. and raccoon. 
* * * 
(39) "Take" means to: 
(a) hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture, 
possess, angle, seine, trap, or kill any pro-
tected wildlife; or 
\b) attempt any action referred to in Sok 
section (a). 
* * * 
(41) "Trapping" means taking protected wild 
life with a trapping device. 
* * * 
(44) "Wildlife" means: 
(a) crustaceans, including brine shrimp 
and crayfish; and 
(b) vertebrate animals living in natunv 
except feral animals. 19W 
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CHAPTER 17 
BIRDS 
Section 
23-17-1 to 23-17-3. Repealed. 
23-17-4. Crop damage by pheasants — Notice to 
division. 
23-17-5. Damages for destroyed crops — Limita-
tions — Appraisal. 
23-17-6. Commercial hunting area — Registra-
tion — License required. 
23-17-7. Falconry authorized. 
23-17-8. Dog field meets. 
23-17-9. Training of dogs — Use of protected or 
privately owned wildlife. 
23-17-10. Waterfowl stamp required — Wildlife 
Board responsibilities — Use of reve-
nues from stamp — Waterfowl Stamp 
Committee. 
23-17-11. Upland game stamp — Use of stamp 
revenues — Upland Game Habitat 
Stamp Committee. 
23-17-1 to 23-17-3. Repealed. 1966, 1968, 1902 
23-17-4. Crop damage by pheasants — Notice to 
divis ion. 
Whenever pheasants are damaging cultivated 
crops on cleared and planted land, the owner of such 
crops shall immediately upon discovery of such dam-
age notify the Division of Wildlife Resources. This 
notice must be made both orally and in writing. Upon 
being notified of such damage, the Division of Wild-
life Resources shall, as far as possible, control such 
damage. 1971 
23-17-5. Damages for destroyed crops — Limita-
tions — Appraisal. 
Whenever pheasants have damaged or destroyed 
cultivated crops on cleared and planted land, the Di-
vision of Wildlife Resources may pay to the crop 
owner for the actual damage not to exceed $200 
yearly, if the owner notifies the Division of Wildlife 
Resources of the damage within 48 hours after the 
damage is discovered. The appraisal of the damage 
shall be made by the crop owner and the Division of 
Wildlife Resources as soon after notification as possi-
ble. If the crop owner and the Division of Wildlife 
Resources are unable to agree on the fair and equita-
ble damage, they shall call upon a third party, con-
sisting of one or more persons acquainted with the 
crops concerned and pheasants, to appraise such dam-
age; but if these provisions relating to damage claims 
are in conflict with the requirements of the federal 
Pittman-Robertson Act or the rules and regulations 
issued under it, then the provisions relating to dam-
age claims shall be null and void. 1971 
23-17-6. Commerc ia l hun t ing a r e a — Regis t ra-
t ion — License r equ i r ed . 
U> Any person desiring to establish, maintain, or 
operate a commercial hunting area within this state 
to permit the releasing and shooting of pen-raised 
birds may apply to the Wildlife Board for authoriza-
tion to do so; and the Wildlife Board is authorized to 
issue the applicant a certificate of registration for the 
purpose according to such rules and regulations con-
cerning the operation of commercial hunting areas 
prescribed by the Wildlife Board. The Wildlife Board 
is empowered to determine the number of commercial 
hunting areas to be authorized in each county of the 
state. 
(2) Any certificate of registration issued under 
Subsection (1) of this section shall authorize the ap-
plicant to propagate, keep, and release for shooting 
on the area covered by the authorization such birds as 
the Wildlife Board may determine, anal the applicant 
may charge a fee for harvesting such birds. 
(3) All persons hunting within the state on any 
commercial hunting area must be in possession ol a 
valid combination license, small game license, or 
commercial hunting area license. Hunting on com-
mercial hunting areas shall he permitted only during 
ihe commercial hunting area season prescribed by 
the Wildlife Board i»7i 
23-17-7. Fa lconry au thor ized . 
The Wildlife Board may authorize the practice of 
falconry within the state of Utah and the capturing 
and keeping in possession of birds to be used in the 
practice of falconry under rules and regulations speci-
fied by it. itm 
23-17-8. Dog field meets . 
It is lawful within the state of Utuh to hold dog 
field meets or trials where dogs are permitted to work 
in exhibition or contest where the skill of dogs is dem-
onstrated by locating or retrieving birds which have 
been obtained from a legal source. Before any meet or 
trial is held, application must be made in writing to 
the Division of Wildlife Resources, which may autho-
rize the meet or trial under rules and regulations 
promulgated by the Wildlife Board. i«7i 
23-17-9. T ra in ing of dogs — Use of p ro tec ted o r 
pr ivate ly owned wildlife. 
The Wildlife Board may authorize the use of pro-
tected wildlife or privately owned wildlife for the 
training of dogs within the state of Utah under rules 
and regulations it may promulgate. it*7i 
23-17-10. Waterfowl s t a m p r equ i r ed — Wildlife 
Board responsibi l i t ies — Use of reve-
n u e s from s t a m p — Waterfowl S t a m p 
Commit tee . 
(1) There is established a waterfowl stamp which 
. shall cost $3.30. No person 16 years of age or older 
may hunt waterfowl without first obtaining a water-
fowl stamp and having that stamp in his possession. 
Use of the waterfowl stamp shall be in accordance 
with rules promulgated by the Wildlife Board. 
(2) All revenues collected from the sale of water-
fowl stamps and related artwork shall be deposited as 
nonlapsing dedicated credits. These revenues shall be 
utilized for the purposes described in Subsection (4) 
and for payment of production, sale, and distribution 
costs of the waterfowl stamps and related artwork. 
Reimbursement for monies expended from waterfowl 
stamp revenues used for approved federal aid projects 
shall be redeposited as nonlapsing dedicated credits. 
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(3) There is created a Waterfowl Stamp Committee 
to establish rules for the creation of the annual stamp 
design. The committee shall consist of five members 
who artf appointed by the Wildlife Board. The com-
mittee rthnU serve without compensation and advise 
the Wildlife Board on the production, sale, and distri-
bution t>f the stamp and related artwork. The Wildlife 
Board tfhall be responsible for the production, sale, 
and distribution of the stamp and related artwork 
and may contract these functions out to any other 
person. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (2), waterfowl 
stamp revenues shall only be used for the develop-
ment, restoration, and preservation of wetlands that 
will be beneficial to waterfowl. Up to 2(W of the an-
nual revenue generated from the account may be al-
located by the Legislature for use by a nonprofit con-
servation organization for wetland development 
projects, in the Pacific fiyway, which will benefit the 
watertowl resources of Utah. IMMS 
23.17-11. Uplund game stump — Use of stamp 
revenues — Upland Game Habitat 
Stamp Committee. 
(1) A* used in this section, "upland game" means 
pheasant, quail, chukar, partridge, Hungarian par-
tridge, suge grouse, rutted grou*>t\ blue grouse, 
mourning dove, cottontail rabbit, or snowshoe hare. 
(2) (a' Except as provided in Subsection (b), a per-
son 16 years of age or older may not hunt upland 
gatne without first obtaining an upland game 
habitat stamp and having that stamp in his pos-
session. 
(t>) ID A person hunting upland game in a 
commercial hunting area registered under 
Section 23-17-6 is not required to obtain and 
possess an upland game stamp. 
(li) A person who has a lifetime hunting 
and fishing license under Section 23-19-17.5 
and has the license in his possession is not 
required to obtain and possess an upland 
game stamp. 
(3) (a> An upland game habitat stamp shall cost 
$5.00. 
(b) Revenue collected from the sale of upland 
game stamps and related artwork shall he depos-
ited in the Upland Game Account created in Sub-
section (4). 
(4) (a^ There is created within the General Fund a 
restricted account known as the Upland Game 
Account. The contents of the account shall con-
sist of the revenues specified in Subsection (3)(b) 
and interest accrued on account monies. 
(b> Monies in the account shall be used for the 
following: 
(i) control of predators; 
(in the development, improvement, resto-
ration, or maintenance of critical habitat 
through the establishment of landowner in-
centives, cooperative programs, or other 
means; 
tin) the acquisition or preservation of crit-
ical habitat; 
(iv) the production, sale, and distribution 
costs of the upland game habitat stamp and 
related artwork; 
(v) landowner habitat education and as-
sistance programs; 
ivi) public access to private lands; 
(vii) upland game transplant and re-intro-
duction programs; and 
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(viii) payments in lieu of property taxes 
for lands purchased with upland game habi-
tat stamp revenues. 
(c) Monies in the account may not be used for 
the acquisition, development, improvement, res-
toration, or maintenance of habitat within com-
mercial hunting areas. 
(d) No more than 5% of the net annual s tamp 
revenues may be used for landowner habitat edu-
cation programs. 
(e> Approximately 7.V/J of the account monies 
shall be allocated to programs and act iv i t ies re-
lat ing to pheasants . The remaining monies shall 
b«' allocated to programs and act ivi t ies re lat ing 
to other upland game species based general ly 
upon the proportion of average annual hunter 
participation for each species. 
( 0 Projects for which free public access is as-
sured shall receive first priority for funding from 
account monies. 
(g> Projects for which public access is assured 
sh"ll receive second priority for funding from ac-
count monies. 
(5) (a) There is created an Upland Game Habitat 
S tamp Commit tee to establ ish rules for the cre-
ation of the annual s tamp design. 
(b> The committee shall consist of three mem-
bers who are appointed by the Wildlife Board. 
(c) The committee shall serve without compen-
sation and advise the Wildlife Board on the pro-
duction, sale , and distribution of the s tamp and 
related artwork. 1W2 
Game birds not requiring a certificate of registra-
tion are: 
All doves and pigeons EXCEPT the following: 
Common ground dove Columbina passerina 
Inca dove Columbina inca 
Mourning dove Zenaida macroura 
Ruddy ground dove Columbina ialpacoii 
White-tipped dove Leptoiila verreauxi 
White-winged dove Zenaida asialica 
Band-tailed pigeon Columba fasciala 
Red-billed pigeon Columba flavirastris 
Black-necked swan Cygnus melanocory phus 
Black swan Cygnus atralus 
Mute swan Cygnus olor 
Button quail Excalfactoria ckinensis 
Cotumix quail Coturnixfail species) 
Ocellated turkey Aariiocharis oceUata 
(C) IN TRANSIT 
Nonresident aviculturists bringing game birds into 
Utah for exhibition and remaining in Utah for a 
period not to exceed 120 hours are exempt from 
the Rule for Collection, Importation, Transporta-
tion and Subsequent Possession of Zoological 
Animals (R608-3). However, a health certificate 
is required. 
R608-4-5 SALES OR PURCHASE 
(A) BILL OF SALE 
A bill of sale must be given or obtained on all 
sales, purchases, exchanges, or gifts, which bill of 
sale must contain the valid certificate of registra-
tion number of the seller. 
(B) RECORDS 
Records must be maintained of purchase, sale, 
barter, trade and propagation of game birds held 
in private ownership; and must indicate the 
species, numbers of birds and dates of transac-
tions, and the name and address of persons 
involved in these transactions. Said records must 
be maintained for the period of time the certificate 
of registration is in effect 
R608-4-6 APPLICATION FOR CERTIFI-
CATE OF REGISTRATION 
To obtain a certificate of registration, a completed 
application form and appropriate fee must be 
submitted to the Wildlife Resources office (see 
R608-4-7) in whose jurisdiction the aviculture 
installation is located. If the applicant is a minor, 
a parent or guardian must co-sign the application 
form and be responsible for compliance with 
these rules. 
If annual sales for activities conducted under an 
aviculture certificate of registration are LESS than 
FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS, the certificate of 
registration fee is TWENTY-FIVE DOLLARS, 
renewable every five years. 
If annual sales for activities conducted under an 
aviculture certificate of registration are MORE 
than FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS, the certifi-
cate of registration fee is ONE HUNDRED 
DOLLARS, renewable every five years. 
R608-4-7 ADDRESSES OF DIVISION 
OFFICES 
Salt Lake Office and Wildlife Registration 
Office, 1596 West North Temple, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84116 
Northern Regional Office, SIS East 5300 South, 
Ogden, Utah 84405 
Central Regional Office, HIS North Main 
Street, Springville, Utah 84663 
Southern Regional Office, 622 North Main 
Street, Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Southeastern Regional Office, 4SS West 
Railroad Avenue, Price, Utah 84501 
Northeastern Regional Office, 152 East 100 
North, Vernal, Utah 84078 
R608-4-8 POSTAMBLE 
It is provided by law that the above rules shall 
have the full force and effect of law. Any 
violation shall be considered a misdemeanor and 
shall be prosecuted as such. Each act in violation 
shall constitute a separate offense. 
State of Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources 
Proclamation 
for the 
Possession of Live Game 
Birds 
o 
w 
S 
Tbbnritbt* effective Mardt 17,19S* 
'UTAH 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
Wild** R*sourc«t 
R608-4 POSSESSION OF LIVE GAME 
BIRDS 
R608-4-1 PREAMBLE 
The Utah Wildlife Board, by authority granted 
under Title 23, Utah Code, hereby issues the 
following rules governing possession of live game 
birds. 
The Rule for Collection, Importation, Transporta-
tion and Subsequent Possession of Zoological 
Animals (R608-3) does not apply to activities 
conducted by holders of valid aviculture certifi-
cates of registration. 
R608-4-2 DEFINITIONS 
(1) Certificate of registration. A document 
granting authority to engage in activities not 
covered by a license, permit, or tag (UCA 23-13-
2(5)). 
(2) Division. The Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources. 
(3) Exotic game birds. All game bird soecies 
that are not native historically to Utah or nave not 
been introduced and established as wild game 
birds in Utah. 
(4) Game birds. Chachalacas, cranes, curras-
sows, flamingoes, francolin, grouse, guans, 
partridge, pheasants, wild pigeons (band-tailed 
and red-billed), quail, ratites (cassowary, emu, 
ostrich, rhea), tinamou, waterfowl and wild doves 
(common ground, Inca, mourning, ruddy ground, 
white-tipped, white-winged), including threatened 
and endangered species. 
(5) Native game birds. Game birds historically 
native to Utah. 
(6) Naturalized game birds. Game birds 
introduced and established as legal wild game 
birds by the state. 
(7) Private wildlife farm or aviculture installa-
tion. An enclosed place such as, but not limited 
to, a pen or aviary, where privately owned game 
birds are propagated or kept and which enclosure 
restricts the birds from escaping into the wild. 
(8) UCA. Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
R608-4-3 GENERAL RULES 
It is unlawful to take any live game bird species 
from the wild. 
Live same birds may not be released or aban-
doned without first obtaining written authoriza-
tion from the Director of the Division. Native and 
naturalized game birds that escape from captivity 
become the property of the state. If an exotic 
game bird species escapes, its owner must make 
every effort to recapture it immediately. The 
Director may authorize the destruction of escaped 
exotic species that are not immediately recap-
tured. 
Any person possessing legally obtained game 
birds not properly certified in accordance with 
these rules wdl be given 60 days from the 
effective date of these rules to obtain a certificate 
of registration. 
The Division may dispose of game birds not 
properly certified in accordance with these rules. 
Game birds or their eggs possessed in captivity in 
accordance with these rules must be confined to 
the registered aviculture installation except when 
in transit or absent for display purposes. 
Any peace officer or special function officer may 
request persons engaged in activities covered 
under these rules to exhibit any documentation 
related to such activities (including, but not 
limited to, certificate of registration, permit, 
health certificate, bill of sale, proof of ownership), 
any game birds, and any device, apparatus and 
facility used for activities covered under these 
rules. 
(A) CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION 
1) Certificate Required 
t is unlawful for anyone to purchase, propagate, 
sell, barter, trade, or dispose of any live game 
birds, or their eggs, without first obtaining an 
aviculture certificate of registration from the Divi-
sion. 
(2) Activities Authorized in Certificate 
Certificate holders may purchase, propagate, 
import, export, sell, barter or trade those species 
designated on their certificate of registration. 
(3) Certificate Nontransferable 
Certificates of registration are nontransferable. 
(4) Other Rules and Regulations 
In many instances, federal, state, county, city or 
municipality rules and regulations covering 
possession and use of game birds are in effect It 
is the responsibility of the applicant to comply 
with such rules and regulations prior to applying 
for an aviculture certificate of registration. 
(5) Exemption 
A certificate of registration IS NOT required for a 
person to acquire live game birds for the purpose 
of training dogs and the sport of falconry; 
provided that the birds are banded, are not held 
tor more than 60 days, and a bill of sale from a 
legal source is in possession. 
(B) APPEAL PROCEDURE 
See R608-2. 
R608-4-4 IMPORTATION AND 
POSSESSION 
(A) HEALTH CERTIFICATES 
All game birds entering the state must be accom-
panied by a valid health certificate. SeeR52-01 
(Utah Department of Agriculture Rules). 
(B) EXEMPT SPECIES 
A certificate of registration IS NOT required for 
importation and possession of the game bird 
species listed below. However, a health certifi-
cate is required to import ALL live birds. 
ADDENDUM "B" 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON (A1061) 
JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, : 
: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Plaintiff, : 
V. : 
: Civil No. 90-0300-302 
DALE GURLEY, : and 
:' Civil No. 91-0300-249 
Defendant. : 
Notice is hereby given that defendant and appellant Dale 
Gurley, through counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson of the law firm of 
Williams & Hunt, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the final 
Amended Judgment of the Honorable David S. Young entered in this 
matter on January 27, 1993. 
The appeal is taken from the entire Amended Judgment entered 
on January 27, 1993, as well as from all prior judgments entered 
in favor of plaintiff, including without limitation the Court's 
Minute Entry dated December 18, 1992, Partial Summary Judgment, 
entered in favor of plaintiff on June 24, 1991, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law signed by the Court on January 5 and 
entered on January 7, 1993, the Order entered by Judge Moffat on 
January 31, 1992, purporting to grant plaintiff an award of 
attorneys' fees as a sanction. Appeal is also taken from the 
trial court's denial of defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant's Motion for 
Relief from Partial Summary Judgment and defendant's Motion for 
Relief from Order of Judge Moffat entered on January 31, 1992. 
DATED this 26th day of February, 1993. 
WIipiAMS & HUNT 
by 1^A\AJ 
Dennis C. Ferguson 1 
Attorneys for Defendant 
017669 
2 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Heather Barney, being duly sworn, says that she is employed 
in the law offices of Williams & Hunt, attorneys for Defendant 
herein; that she served the NOTICE OF APPEAL in Civil Nos. 90-
0300-302 and 91-0300-249 before the Third District Court for 
Tooele County, upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Daniel D. Darger 
32 Exchange Place, Suite #100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Parker M. Nielson 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City,'Utah 84111 
Harold G. Christensen 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Snow, Christensen fc.Martineau 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
and causing the same to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
day of February, 1993. 
Q^ 
Heather^ -fiarney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 2 ^ day of 
February, 1993 
Notary Puhlb 
.CRISTINH.UO/^'. 
257 East 2C0S"->. 
Slit Lako City, o* •: 
My Commissi: ^  c . r 1
 July30.1994 
SCO I 
•S11 
I 
I 
<4&&dL ^ p cary 
Residing in the State of Utah 
ADDENDUM "C" 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ] 
DALE GURLEY, 
Defendant. 
i AMENDED JUDGMENT 
i Civil Nos. 90-0300-302 
i 91-0300-249 
i Judge David S. Young 
The Court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and having tried the issues remaining on October 21 
and 22, 1992, sitting without a jury, and having entered its 
Memorandum Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having entered 
formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based thereon 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court makes and enters the following 
J U D G M E N T 
1. The Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, 
is affirmed and adopted herein. 
2. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of conversion. 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract. 
4. Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in 
the amount of $2,3 00.00 
5. Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting 
in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from 
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or 
interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry 
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further 
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands 
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or 
indirectly, described as follows: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West. SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
6. Plaintiff is awarded costs, and attorneys7 fees in the 
amount of $15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56. 
ENTERED this ^7 day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
hi 
DAVID S. YOUNG 
District Court Judge 
(0633N) 
2 
ADDENDUM "D" 
I': Exchange Place 
Salt Lake rity, UT ^ : i . 
Telephone- ° ^ l " 1 - ^ 6 8 6 
PARKER M. N1EL.SON (...) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT '-^  i . 
Telephone *• • - 11 SO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff,
 t._ ie 
I N T H E THIRD. JUDICIAL ti~ I — COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
IS i /\ j t 
PARKKK -n..—?- ] 
Plaintiff,, 
DALE GURLEY,' ] 
Defendant, ] 
I JUDGM-
I y0-ujuu-^.j2 
1 91-0300-249 
1 J i idge Da < :i :1 S i 1 : i n l :j 
The Court having entered Partial Summary .Judgment herei n dated 
June 24 , ] 991, and having tri ed the issues remaining on October 21 
ai id 22 , 199 *!,, i thout a jury, a i id 1: lav i ng entui • x x ts 
Memorandum Decision dated December 1 8, 1992, and ha\:n- entered 
formal Find i ngs of I'Yict and C'onc] us ions of I .aw based thereon 
NOW, Ti lEREl^ URJi,, the Coiii: t makes and enters tl: ie fol ] owing 
.
T TT n
 r K E N T 
1: - -'.wir1 -udgment previously entered on June 4, *j9i, 
: . Judgment
 fc- u-ante-: • favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant wn i-iaxiiLj.il' t» ^ xaxm of conversion. 
3. Judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant on Plaintiff's claim of interference with a contract. 
4. Damages are awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant in 
the amount of $2,3 00.00 
5. Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any person acting 
in concert or participation with him, is permanently enjoined from 
diminishing or interfering with, or attempting to diminish or 
interfere with the relationship of Plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training, including by attempting to persuade the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry 
that their activities are unlawful, or from conducting further 
wildlife management activities on Plaintiff's leasehold lands 
situated in Tooele County, State of Utah, either directly or 
indirectly, described as follows: 
Township 9 South, Range 6 West, SLB&M 
Section 15: SW4, W2SE4 
Section 16: SE4 
Section 22: N2NW4 
6. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$15,000.00 under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
ENTERED this £> day of J2^^^r^l992>. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S. 
District 
(0633N) 
/-i u u n i\ u u 1 vi "" t;" 
»~ THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C i 
L, AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Vs. 
DALE GOURLEY, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
9003000302 and 
9103000249 
jury was waived. .IK. . uii considered all remaining ivsues oi taw. a; „v. presented by 
member of the bar and by his attorney, Daniel Darger. The defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney, Du . »><^ on. The court heard the testimony 
witnesses as presented, received u». evidence introduced both documentary and testimonial 
and further heard the arguments of counsel and based on the foregoing renders its 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. This action arose through the conduct of the defendant on or about 
Septembi :rein the defendant forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes 
referred to by the defendant as a "trap," forcefully disiurbed the enclosed nature of the pen, 
tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took certain private property that was 
located there without the consent of the owner. 
2. At the time the defendant engaged in such conduct, he knew or should 
have known that the pen was being used or could have been used in connection with 
appropriate sport dog which training had been conducted at that location for some years 
prior. The defendant knew or should have known that the property was that of Parker 
Nielson, the plaintiff in this action. 
3. The court finds that the defendant knew of the activities of dog 
trainers in that area, both in training their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that the 
defendant had openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike for their 
activities. Further, the defendant knew or should have been chargeable with the duty to 
know that his predetermined opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement 
peace officer and that those individuals engaged in that aspect of sport training were fully 
authorized to engage in such and the defendant's conduct in complicating their activities was 
an inappropriate predilection and bias from which the defendant should have refrained. The 
court finds that it is not illegal to own, posses, or operate a bird pen equipped with recapture 
cones nor is it illegal for a person to "take" any bird held in private ownership lawfully by 
means of a recapture cone or pen. 
2 
4. "nie com I recognizes that it could occur that wild game could bo M> 
21 ,j mured and the pen owner would be obligated to release such "wild" game or unbanded 
( ., ^ s showed that there was 
not expected to be any vtiucker/pu.tndge wild gjr.ie i *K* a<o and the defendant's own 
miles distance. 
5 The court finds that the defendant did act with malice, both in his 
gi iii-1111 \ in Mi' 111 ill ie cl ;: li u a ii lii ig a :ti itj ai id i i i pa i tici iila i lo Mr. Nielsoi i vhom ne > -v 
or should have known, had an appi opriate leasehold interest and the right, to retake banded 
birds pi in: c l ia se .d f ::»! * i p il: 1|  i!i ;|- - l>1; : 1 ' Il£ ;|: a:l *• :1' 1| " > :- d ii i ti ail ill ng 
6. 1 he court i in 1 her t inds that the defendant went beyond his appropriate 
the Utah Division of I -ands ai id I :orestr> ai id then officials in seeking to ha\ e tl lose 
government agencies investigate the activities oi tl: ie plaintiff ai id create pi.-nieu* - ^ 
plaintiff in conducting his appropriate and lawful activities. 
7. The coin t finds that the defendant specifically attempted to diminish 
tl : .nterested in 
Forest bervKC tn taking boresi Service omuu.s to the plaintiffs leased premises and in 
aiietupLiiti'1 lo pci MJiidi, IIH is.!, ul I n mi.l I. ill lat ill ic p h IIII i t i l II * a ; ; l i espassing oi l I: "orest Service 
land and was conducting unlawl ul activities thereoi I. 
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8. The court finds that the defendant's conduct was beyond the scope of 
his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted. 
9. The court finds the defendant's conduct was wrongful and constituted 
an effort to disregard the proclamations of the Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis 
upon which the court could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual basis to 
enjoin the defendant individually from such conduct both in relation to the plaintiff's 
leasehold land interest and in relation to others similarly engaged in lawful activities 
throughout the state. 
10. The court finds that the evidence established at trial shows that the 
defendant acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless way in disregard of the rights 
of the plaintiff and his leasehold interest in the land in question. The court notes that the 
uncontroverted evidence is that land useful for dog training of the type and description 
herein is difficult to find, difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the purpose 
of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of the range of six square miles, is 
ideally necessary for this kind of activity. This location is one of the very few potential 
sites available to dog trainers in the state of Utah. 
11. The court finds that since the underlying ground leasehold interest 
remains intact and there is no present indication that it will not be renewed, that no 
damages should be assessed for the interference with the leasehold activities as a result of 
the destruction of the pen. 
4 
• 12. The • ;: • : 11 ,• t f inds that the supervisors of the defendant n 1 tl ie Division of 
Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of the defendant's dislike for the activities 
of .iould 
have n- disciplined Uis defendant pnoi ».. trw destruction hv ih. Je lc ik^m .-'* 
plain iii 
the defendant's misconduct ai id afl irmatively tried to limit the defendant and shouic 
sought to remedy the situation with the plaintil i 
13. 1 he c oi ill 1 inds that the defendant's claim that the pei i was a "trap" 
under the law is not supported by the evidence and the defendant has failed to meet his 
this was an appropiiaie recapture pen that were ki lown or should have beei I ki now i i lo the 
def endant I he) ii icli ide bi it i u e i ie t lii lit : i t : lllr :: t : 11 : • n lg: 
a. The pen was on land known used for upland game dog training 
by Parkei Nielsoi i ai id others and should have caused the del endant to be 
a w a r e | } i a l recapture pens could be placed thereon. 
b. At the site of the pen, their were bands used for banding 
those bands could be placed on wild game so captured, the del endant should 
have rec a I le d 11 i a t n o i ; • i I d c I I u c k e i ,"1  p a i 11 i d g e 1 i a d b ee i i s I g I it t e d 11 i t It i a t a re a 
by him and that bet oi e destrc- " - " - *y r-«<. he at least could 1 lave takei I 
5 
the band numbers and inquired whether those bands had been appropriately 
sold to a licensed "chucker/partridge" bird owner. 
c. The recapture cones are designed to recapture, without injury, 
training birds and that should have given the defendant an obvious indication 
that the pen could be their for a lawful purpose. 
14. The defendant had multiple indicators that the pen was there for a 
lawful purpose and could have at least, without offensively, knocking it down, releasing the 
birds contained therein and destroying the pen, made appropriate inquiries as to who the 
owner might be, as to whose land it might be positioned on, and whether the pen could have 
been placed there for a lawful purpose. 
15. The court further finds that the defendant has in the conduct of the 
defense intentionally filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally taken a 
defensive posture that was inappropriate under the circumstances in that the defendant or the 
Division of Wildlife Resources should have readily offered to remove the defendant from 
further enforcement activities on this property knowing full well that the defendant 
maintained continuing hostility toward the plaintiff and his activities. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court makes its 
6 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Summary Judgment previously entered on June 4, 1991, is 
affirmed herein. 
2. That the ownership, possession, and operation of the bird pens for 
domestic birds properly equipped with recapture cones or devices is a lawful and proper use 
under the laws of the state of Utah. 
3. Peace officers, including conservation officers such as the defendant 
are prohibited from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by the plaintiff. 
4. The defendant in this case may not be heard to claim that the 
plaintiffs pen was there for the intended capture of "wild" birds as it was being used 
appropriately and within legal rights. 
5. The court finds that the damages to the pen and the replacement costs 
assessed in damages to the defendant are $2,300 00. 
6. The court finds tji^ t the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees under 
§ 78-27-56 of * IS*; DPd . — f^Xj 
7. The court finds that it is appropriate to issue a permanent injunction 
against this individual defendant from further activities on the plaintiffs leasehold land in 
relation to Wildlife Management activities. This is not mconsistent with the defendant's 
duties under the circumstances since the defendant has been transferred to Cedar City, and 
7 
should thus have no objection to avoiding any future confrontation associated with the 
plaintiff and the land in question. 
8. The court declines to grant further punitive damages. The plaintiff is 
awarded damages and fees as stated herein and costs incurred herein. 
DATED this dll day of T ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ 5 ^ - 1992. 
JAVID S. YOUNG 
District CoimJtfuge 
'2 ^^^lu^
 t
lgJ 
'*" -">-i? 30JL -v *9fO'-iOo30^ 
DANIEL DARGER (0815) 
100 Commercial Club Building 
32 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6686 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DALE GURLEY, ] 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil NOS. 90-0300-302 
I 91-0300-249 
I Judge David S. Young 
The court having entered Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, and the Defendant having waived jury trial and 
having tried the issues remaining on October 21 and 22, 1992, 
sitting without a jury, the Defendant being present in person and 
represented by his counsel, Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq., and the 
Plaintiff being present in person and represented by his counsel, 
Daniel Darger, Esq., and the parties having presented evidence, 
both documentary and testimonial, and the court being fully 
advised in the premises, and having entered its Memorandum 
Decision dated December 18, 1992, and having directed the 
Plaintiff to prepare formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a Judgment consistent therewith by Minute Entry dated 
December 18, 1992. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This action arose through the conduct of Defendant, Dale 
Gurley ("Gurley" herein), admitted by Gurley in his Answers to 
Interrogatories, his Affidavit herein, his Investigative Report 
and his trial testimony, wherein on September 8, 1990, Gurley 
forcefully broke into a locked pen, sometimes referred to by 
Gurley as a "trap," forcefully disturbed the enclosed nature of 
the pen, tipped it on its side, dismantled certain parts and took 
certain private property located there without the consent of the 
owner. 
2. At the time Gurley engaged in such conduct he knew, or 
should have known, that the pen was used or could have been used 
in connection with appropriate sporting dog training, and that 
such training had been conducted at that location for a period of 
years previously, and knew or should have known that the property 
was that of Plaintiff. 
3. The court finds that Gurley knew of the activities of dog 
trainers in the area where the pen was located, both in training 
their dogs and in conducting field trials, and that Gurley had 
openly expressed to those dog trainers his hostility and dislike 
for their activities. The court finds, further, that Gurley knew 
or was chargeable with duty to know that his predetermined 
opinions were improper as a wildlife resources enforcement peace 
officer, including because of the matters found as facts at 
2 
paragraphs D through F of the Partial Summary Judgment herein 
dated June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted 
herein by reference thereto, and that persons engaged in the sport 
of dog training were fully authorized by law to do so and that 
Gurley's conduct in complicating their activities was an 
inappropriate predilection and bias from which Gurley should have 
refrained. 
4. The court finds that it is not illegal to own, possess, or 
operate a bird pen equipped with recapture cones or devices, nor 
is it illegal for a person to "take" any bird held in private 
ownership lawfully acquired by means of a recapture pen. 
5. The court recognizes that it could occur that wild game 
could become captured in a lawful device such as Plaintiff's pen 
and that the definitions of "take" and "trapping" in the Fish and 
Game code, their reference to "attempt[ing] any action" in 
particular would obligate the owner to release such "wild" game 
when so captured. However, the testimony of the witnesses 
established that there was no expectation that any wild Chukar 
Partridge would be in the area of Plaintiff's pen and Gurley's own 
testimony was that he had not seen any in the area of Plaintiff's 
pen but had seen some at approximately five miles distance. 
6. The court further finds that Gurley acted with malice, 
both in his general views of the dog training activity and in 
particular to Plaintiff, whom he knew or should have known had an 
appropriate leasehold interest and the right to retake game birds 
lawfully acquired from a private wildlife farm and used in dog 
training. 
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7. The court finds that Gurley went beyond his appropriate 
duties as a Wildlife Resources Officer by contacting the United 
States Forest Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry, 
and their officials, in seeking to have those government agencies 
investigate Plaintiff and create problems for the Plaintiff in 
conducting his appropriate and lawful activities. 
8. The court finds that Gurley specifically attempted to 
diminish the relationship of the plaintiff and others interested 
in dog training with the United States Forest Service by taking 
Forest Service officials to Plaintiff's leased premises and 
attempting to persuade those officials that Plaintiff was 
trespassing on forest land and was conducting unlawful activities 
thereon. 
9. The court finds that Gurley's conduct was beyond the scope 
of his appropriate duties and he should not have so acted. 
10. The court finds that Gurley's conduct was wrongful and 
constituted an effort to disregard the proclamations of the 
Wildlife Board and formed a sufficient basis upon which the court 
could and does determine that there is an appropriate factual 
basis to enjoin Gurley individually from such conduct, both in 
relation to Plaintiff's leasehold land in the vicinity of Vernon, 
Utah, and in relation to any persons engaged in lawful dog 
training activities elsewhere in the State of Utah. 
11. The court finds that the evidence established at trial 
that Gurley acted in a wilful, malicious, and knowingly reckless 
way in disregard of the rights of Plaintiff and his leasehold 
interest in the land in question. The court finds that the 
4 
uncontroverted evidence established that land useful for dog 
training of a suitable type and description is difficult to find, 
difficult to value, and difficult to effectively utilize for the 
purpose of dog training because substantial acreage, upwards of or 
in the range of six square miles, is ideally necessary for such 
activity. The court further finds that the evidence established 
that the location of Plaintiff's leased land is one of a very few 
potential sites available to dog trainers in the State of Utah 
which are so suitable. 
12. The court finds that since Plaintiff's underlying 
leasehold remains intact and there is no evidence of a present 
indication that it will not be renewed, no damages should be 
assessed for Gurley's interference with Plaintiff's leasehold 
activities resulting from his destruction of Plaintiff's pen. 
13. The court finds that the supervisors of Gurley in the 
Division of Wildlife Resources knew or should have known of 
Gurley's dislike for the activities of Plaintiff and others 
engaged in similar dog training activities and that they should 
have appropriately disciplined Gurley prior to the destruction by 
Gurley of Plaintiff's pen. The court further finds that the 
supervisors of Gurley in the Division of Wildlife Resources should 
have readily acknowledged Gurley's misconduct and affirmatively 
restrained Gurley and sought to remedy the effects of Gurley's 
misconduct with Plaintiff. 
14. The court finds that Gurley's claim that Plaintiff's bird 
pen was a "trap" is not supported by the evidence and Gurley has 
failed to meet his burden of proof that the pen was used as a 
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"trap" or with the intent to "take" any "protected wildlife." 
15, The court finds that there were several indicators that 
Plaintiff's recapture pen was appropriate and lawful which were 
known or should have been known to Gurley, including but not 
limited to the following: 
a. The pen was on land Gurley knew was used for upland 
game dog training by Plaintiff and others, and Gurley knew or 
should have been aware that recapture pens could properly be 
placed thereon. 
b. Bands used for banding live game birds, lawfully 
acquired, when used for dog training were found by Gurley at 
the site of the pen. 
c. Despite Gurley's arguments that the bands could be 
placed on wild birds, which were not lawfully acquired, Gurley 
knew or should have recalled that no wild Chukar Partridge had 
been seen by him in the area where the pen was located. 
d. Gurley should have inquired, before destroying 
Plaintiff's property, if the bands had been sold by or to a 
licensed Chukar Partridge owner for appropriate use in dog 
training. 
e. Gurley knew, or should have known, and could have 
observed that the recapture cones are designed to recapture 
training birds without injury and it should therefore have 
been obvious to him that the pen was maintained for a proper 
purpose. 
16. Gurley had multiple indicators that Plaintiff's pen was 
there for a lawful purpose and was obligated, including for the 
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reasons determined in the Partial Summary Judgment herein dated 
June 24, 1991, which findings are reaffirmed and adopted herein by 
reference thereto, before offensively knocking it down, releasing 
the birds contained therein and destroying the pen, to make 
appropriate inquiries as to who the owner might be, as to whose 
land it might be situated on and whether the pen was there for a 
lawful purpose. 
17. The court further finds that Gurley has intentionally 
filed a false affidavit with the court and has intentionally 
conducted a defense that was inappropriate under the circumstances 
and was without merit and not asserted in good faith. 
18. The court further determines that the lack of merit and 
bad faith of Gurley's defense includes that Gurley or the Division 
of Wildlife Resources and its representatives, including their 
representatives herein, should have readily offered to remove 
Gurley from further enforcement activities on Plaintiff's property 
knowing full well that Gurley harbored continuing hostility toward 
Plaintiff and dog training activities. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the court makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
1. The Partial Summary Judgment herein dated June 24, 1991, 
is reaffirmed and adopted herein. 
2. The ownership, possession and operation of a bird pen for 
live game birds, lawfully acquired, equipped with recapture cones 
or devices, is lawful and proper under the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-17-2 and Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3. 
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3. Peace officers, including Conservation Officers such as 
Defendant, are prohibited by the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned by 
Plaintiff. 
4. Defendant may not contend that Plaintiff's recapture pen 
was there for or intended to capture "wild" birds as it was being 
used appropriately and within legal rights. 
5. The court determines that the facts establish the elements 
of conversion. 
6. The court determines that the facts establish the elements 
of interference with a contract, consisting of Plaintiff's lease 
agreement with the State of Utah. 
7. The court finds that the damages to the pen and 
replacement costs assessed in damages to the Defendant are 
$2,300.00. 
8. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's 
fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 of $15,000.00. 
9. The court finds and determines that the damages resulting 
from Defendant's interference with Plaintiff's contract rights are 
difficult or impossible to determine, including because 
Plaintiff's lease and the uses to which it was being put are 
unique, have no market value and cannot be compensated for in 
money damages, within the meaning and intent of System Concepts, 
Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1983), and that 
Defendant's wrongs are of a continuing character, the nature, 
extent and value of which can be estimated only by conjecture, and 
that the acts of Defendant are continuing or are threatened to 
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continue, and that there is a need to enjoin and restrain 
Defendant Dale Gurley, individually, and any persons acting in 
concert or participation with him from further activities in 
relation to Wildlife Management on Plaintiff's leasehold land in 
the vicinity of Vernon, Utah, or from attempting to diminish the 
relationship of Plaintiff and others interested in dog training, 
including by attempting to persuade the United States Forest 
Service and the Utah Division of Lands and Forestry that their 
activities are unlawful. The court further finds that such an 
injunction is not inconsistent with Defendant's duties under the 
circumstances, since the evidence indicated that Gurley had been 
transferred to Cedar City and thus should have no objection to 
avoiding future confrontation with Plaintiff, dog trainers or the 
land which is the subject of this suit. 
10. Plaintiff is awarded fees as stated herein, and costs 
incurred herein, 
ENTERED 
BY THE COURT: 
rein. ^—^ 
this S^d&y of^fee«!*w^l99^r 
DAVID S./YOUNG 
District xourt AJucIg^  
(0633N) 
MARY LOU GODBE (1210) 
1390 Yale Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Telephone: (801) 582-8857 
PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN TIN* 'I'll 1 IM) JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OK UTAH 
III" lli'KKR M. NIELSON, ] 
i ' I . I i i i e, 
v s . \ 
m iLE GURLEY, 
Defei idant. ] 
i III1111- H i I'll AI SUM 
| C:i v i l No,. 
I ' l a u i t i t t ' ii Motion f o r Summary Judgment And To Ponifit 1 
I i i ' i covery was h e a r d on M<ii II mm t he P l a i n t i f f b e i n q p r e s e n t 
i l l pe rson mil i i 11 r i i nl i il hi III 11 , II II i MM II I mi I MJ I n s ill I i ncy , 
anil I liii' Defendant 1M inn repiesented b\ Reed M. Stringham, Esq., 
his attorney, and thp f'omt naving considered the plead inn the 
d f f i r i m in I in II ill HI in in I 11 il I mi in i I I in mi HI II i » i I mi i iiii I 11 I I in I ill mi l il mi I in ill i o n , 
I u i j i i t h e i w i t h D e f e n d a n t * s i i i v e s t i g a t . I V I i u f i n r t a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o , 
I In" A n s w e r s t n I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s a n d Pf r iu i id i i i i l '<:• S u p p l e m e n t a l 
f\ n n M P v • t I 1 1 mi mi in I mi I f r """ I i II I  i II 11II I mi II II i > i i I N |, 1 1 i, 11 i up s I Il ) e t e n d a r\ i 
dinl His Counsel, and having heard statements of counsel and being 
fully advised in fh^ prelTl]c,,| determines and rules thai *|'MM I 
m. 'itf'hiimr* ISMIT ii l(i " lliji I " I I nv i ng material tacts and makes and 
Jfr 
enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. It is admitted by Defendant in his answers to 
interrogatories, his affidavit herein and his investigative 
report, that on September 8, 1990, Defendant gained entrance to a 
locked pen belonging to Plaintiff constituting an "enclosure," by 
removing the wire netting from the door, disturbed or interferred 
with it by tipping it on its side, removed or dismantled parts of 
the enclosure and took private property located therein without 
the consent of the owner. 
B. Defendant knew, or was chargeable with knowledge, that the 
pen or enclosure was used in connection with dog training, and 
Defendant was informed or had reason to believe on September 8, 
1990, that the pen or enclosure and property therein belonged to 
Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was staying in a camper behind the 
store in Vernon. 
C. It is admitted that Plaintiff was known to Defendant since 
at least 1986. 
D. It is uncontroverted, and the court takes notice of the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-15 and the Proclamation for 
Taking of Upland Game, that "it is unlawful for any person, 
without the consent of the owner or person in charge of any 
privately owned land, to tear down, mutilate or destroy any . . . 
enclosure". 
E. Defendant has admitted that it is not illegal, per se, to 
own, possess or operate a bird pen equipped with recapture cones 
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or devices (or a "bird trap,,, m i f the enclosure can be so 
described). 
F. Dc* I. eiidii-tiit h i ts h i r t l i e i adm I I, iedi I I I 41 ill, i s ee l i II l leqall leu 
a person tn *l,,aker'' any biid held in private ownership lawfully 
iii" ijurred by means of a recapture pi n | i a "bird trap,* il the 
I";.1! iirnjii! " t i i i i in II II «(• , :n Il I n , ' j v J in I "i ill II IL , lie; "i J bed ) . 
G, The facts admitted in Defendant's answers to 
i nterroqatories , includinq h ;i s invest j qat i vc reports , establish 
t h a t iJoleniJaiTl , \ a s S U ! 1; i c i en l , II. y I m.i in i J ii.n i i I Ii I  In Il a w s nine! 
mi i |Li Lat i o n s c o n c e r n i n g p o s s e s s i o n of l i v e game b i r d s , aiiiid t h e 
p r o p e r p r o c e d u r e Ihni q u e s t i on i nq t h e a u t h o r i t y el p e r s o n s in 
j | , l l l L J b fc* fa ' in I "l I III III if I III I "I J l l n l 111 H ' I I III III I I i , I I I I III I m l I I n III III III III III III ( l . f I t ' f J l l HI; I I III i III I I III I iii 
conduct was with malice towards dog trainers as a group or 
Plaintiii -.. ^--.ticular. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1 . T i l l i e II mi II I I I m i l l in i n ' i II in i n mi II i in 1 I I I i mi II in. i l l i e J I II II n I  i :ii t::]l: :i i i: i 
t li P meaninq iiml i n t en t ol Rule 56(c) aiul m i I | III ih Ru les ol i:i v; i ] 
P r o c e d u r e , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i s s u e s nt t h e l e g a l i t y of 
I I 1 III in mi II I i l l mi 11 i i t j s . e e . s j i mi in in in II 111 »e i 11 i i I I I Il i i 
equipped with recaJ I devices, whethei so desci ibed or 
characterized as a "bird trap"' the Legality of Plaintiff's 
i' e c a p t mi III III HI II I I I mi in mi I I I 11 mi mi i l i II II I I I III III ,, i ] i i i i HI i III mi II I I I II III 
Defendan t e n L e i e d , Lore down, d e f a c e d , m u t i l a t e d o r d e s t r o y e d t h e 
e n c l o s u r e w i t h o u t P l a i n t i f f ' s c o n s e n t , and P l a i n t i f f i s e n t i t l e d 
II HI i I I  II III II III II II i J i n i H i i d in |„ mi i i i i i l i j i i i i i e i l in I. 1 11 i 1 1 II in • n i l • . 
2, The o w n e r s h i p , p o s s e s s i o n and o p e r a t i o n nT a b i r d pen f o r 
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domestic game birds equipped with recapture cones or devices (or a 
"bird trap," if the structure alleged herein can be so described) 
is lawful and proper under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-17-2 declaring that *[i]t is unlawful for any person to take 
any birds not held in private ownership legally acquired. . ." 
(emphasis added) and Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3 
prohibiting the release or abandonment of live game birds without 
a permit but permitting the use of live game birds for dog 
training if banded and lawfully acquired. 
3. The recapture of live domestic game birds, lawfully 
acquired pursuant to the Proclamation for the Possession of Live 
Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § 608-4, including by means 
of bird pens equipped with recapture cones or devices (or a "bird 
trap," if the structure alleged herein can be so described) is 
lawful and proper, including under provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 23-13-2(39) defining "wildlife" as including "any species of 
vertebrate animal life except feral animals generally living in a 
state of nature" and Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-1(9) defining "feral 
animals" as meaning "any animal which is normally domesticated and 
which has reverted to the wild." (Emphasis added.) 
4. The provisions of the Proclamation for the Possession of 
Live Game Birds, Utah Administrative Code § 608-4-3, that 
"[n]ative and naturalized game birds that escape from captivity 
become the property of the state" do not prohibit the recapture of 
domestic game birds, lawfully acquired, which are used in dog 
training unless they "escape" from captivity by their owner and 
"revert" to the wild such as by reproducing in a state of nature. 
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l ) i ? f e in 11: i 11 in 11 i mi I in i i in I in i I I 1 1 1 i " I II II i "i" I II in i 11 mi 11 >' mi 1 1 1 1 ii,« Il  1 1 1 i in II in I Il " I mi in mi in i in 
23-20-15 from breaking into an enclosure such as that owned liny 
Plaintiff 'The prnpor procedure is prescribed Hit lit iilm 
I Ill III ill III III I I I III i l l , I i l l II III l I I Ml III I ) I O i l II I I l III III III I III 11 III 1 1 III III III I I I I I III I ( l P i l l II l < l in III III III O P I .< > 
" r e q u e s t p e r s o n I o e x h i b i t <my i lnrumentat ion r e l a t e d t o " 
p o s s e s s i o n of qamo bird*-. 'The conduc t n1 Defendan t war t h e r e f o r e 
in) in I In i mi ill p ruh i ib l r < in ii uu iiulhni \\
 l undei jn u v i s i i mi oil lit iih Coilo 
Ann, fe 21-20-1 t h a t C o n s e r v a t i o n O f f i c e r s " s h a l l fo l low t h e same 
p r o c e d u r e m . . . e n f o r c e m e n t of t h i s c o d e , a s o t h e r p e a c e 
Defendan t may n o t c o n t e n d t h a t t h e b i r d in P l a i n t i f f ' s 
r e r a p f , i f c * r •— •• " w i l d , * * o r t h a t in II u . unit iiliriiiiip >-t i r iiiiiill II «y f i l l 1 y 
a c q u i r e d , . . .it hav J iiu in I us I. on d e s t r o y e d t h e u v u U i i v 
c o n s i s t i n g of t h e t u r d I t s e l f and t h u s p r e v e n t e d P l a i n t i f f from 
r i >
 •*" n n c o n t r n v o r t e d a 1 1 o q a t i o n r i t h a t t h e h i r i l w"i r . ( i n q u i r e d 
in in in I  in i I ill I  MI mi i i HIM T i n i i n i l I 11 HI i n f e i <J I i i mi I lliiiii 
destruction M( the evidence that it; would be adverse to 
w*w vxdiins and contentions of Defendant 
7 • D o II ( j i in J mi ill mi 11 mi i I i > i i 'ii I I i in I I i i 'i • II II in I M I i I 1 1 ) . i II i m I II II 11 II I i II | 
H i " t e d O c t o b e r ,' II i n l u l l y , c o m p l e t e l y and u n d e r o a t h . 
R. Tho issues remaininq for trial, within time meaning and 
ill in in II I " mi in III, Il  In ,1 II I i I ill I I I I Ill II I I II Il I mi mi II II in ( i r e d i n o , J I I Il in 
question on It damages or other appropriate relief, including the 
extent an 1 *-**'• • •* nf any defamatory 1 ifoments concerning 
IMciint J 1; 1, maae JD,. hot oiid»jiit , .mull III < I miii'iil s ot conversion, 
interference with contract lights and ilo f amat i on (but m it 
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including the defense of truth of any statements that Plaintiff 
violated the law), respectively. 
ENTERED t h i s 7 W d a v o f HiJ^K 1 9 9 1 . 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE r 
(0432N) 
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PARKER M. NIELSON (2413) 
655 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1150 
Attorney for Plaintiff, pro se 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PARKER M. NIELSON, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
DALE GURLEY, 
Defendant. ] 
i ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT 
\ OF DALE GURLEY AND 
i FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
I Civil No. 900 300 302 
I Judge Pat B. Brian 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley or 
Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 11 having been submitted for 
decision pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-501(1)(d), Rules of 
Judicial Administration, and the Court having considered 
Plaintiff's motion and the documents attached thereto, Plaintiff's 
memorandum in support thereof, Defendant's memorandum in 
opposition dated November 25, 1991, together with the attachments 
thereto, and Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Strike Gurley Affidavit dated December 2, 1991; and the Court 
having entered its Minute Entry dated December 23, 1991, finding 
(1) that the Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1990, does 
not comply with Rules 7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
(2) that the Gurley Affidavit dated April 18, 1990, is riddled 
with untruths, and (3) the Court adopts the reasons stated by 
Plaintiff in his motion, and in particular as stated in 
ADDENDUM "H* 
CJ7-
1 l
^
u
 u _ FC 
Plaintiff's reply memorandum including that Gurley either made a 
knowing misrepresentation or knowingly made a false statement that 
he knew the matters stated in the affidavit to be true, for the 
purpose of denying Plaintiff's rights in this litigation 
wrongfully and without just cause or excuse; and, 
The Court having further determined that Gurley is a "party" 
who signed said Affidavit in violation of the provisions of Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that the signature of an 
attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has 
read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that to the best of 
his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable 
inquiry it is well grounded in fact, and, 
The Court having determined that sanctions will be awarded 
against Gurley, and 
The Court having considered the Affidavit of Parker M. Nielson 
concerning his professional time in searching the records of the 
Third Circuit Court in Tooele, Utah, and the Sixth Circuit Court 
in Nephi, Utah, writing correspondence to counsel for Gurley 
herein requesting voluntary compliance with requirements of Rule 
11 and in filing and briefing Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Dale Gurley or Require Compliance with Rules 7 and 
11, and having considered the Affidavit of Paul T. Moxley 
concerning the reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time, 
and having determined that the amount of $3,289.00 is equal to the 
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in that 
regard, and 
Being fully advised in the premises, it is hereby 
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ORDERED, 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Dale Gurley 
or Require Compliance with Rule 7 and 11 is granted. 
2. The Affidavit of Dale Gurley dated April 18, 1991, is 
hereby stricken, however and wherever it may appear in these 
proceedings, for the reasons that it was not signed or otherwise 
certified by at least one attorney of record, as required by Rules 
7 and 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and because it is clear 
that it is riddled with untruths. 
3. Sanctions are hereby awarded to Plaintiff and against 
Defendant Dale Gurley in the amount of $3,289.00, representing the 
fair and reasonable value of Plaintiff's professional time in 
searching the records of the Third and Sixth Circuit Courts, 
writing correspondence to counsel requesting voluntary compliance 
with Rule 11 and in filing and briefing the motion granted herein. 
4. It is further ordered, pursuant to provisions of Rule 
4-505(3), Rules of Judicial Administration, that this order shall 
be augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees 
expended in collecting said amount awarded as sanctions by 
execution or otherwise as shall be established by affidavit. 
DATED this ->/ .faay of January, 1992. 
- 3 -
Address of Judgment Debtor: 
Dale M. Gurley 
328 North 700 East 
Payson, Utah 84651 
Social Security No. (unknown) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3~rd- day of January, 1992, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER STRIKING AFFIDAVIT 
OF DALE GURLEY AND FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS was mailed first class, 
postage prepaid to: 
John P. Soltis 
Reed M. Stringham III 
Assistant Attorneys General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
(402N) 
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